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WAITING IN IMMIGRATION LIMBO:
THE FEDERAL COURT SPLIT OVER SUITS TO
COMPEL ACTION ON STALLED ADJUSTMENT
OF STATUS APPLICATIONS
Lauren E. Sasser*
This Note explores the conflict surroundingfederal courts' authority to
hear injunctive suits from adjustment of status applicants demanding U.S.
Citizenship and Immigration Services action on significantly delayed
applications. The conflict turns on whether the agency has a duty to
adjudicate applications properly before it, whether it must do so in a
reasonabletime, and whether any statutespreclude jurisdiction. The Note
argues that the agency has a duty to adjudicate applications properly
before it in a reasonabletime. When it violates that duty, applicantsshould
have legal recourse in all jurisdictions.
INTRODUCTION

Akram Safadi was born in Lebanon and came to the United States as a
student in 1983. After earning a Ph.D. in engineering, Safadi remained in
the United States on a temporary work visa granted in 1997. In November
2002, he filed an application with U.S. Citizenship and Immigration
Services (USCIS) for an adjustment to lawful permanent resident (LPR)
status, a process that then typically took about six months.' Four years and
multiple Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) name checks, fingerprint
checks, and border inspection checks later, USCIS concluded that "issues
remain requiring further inquiry," and declined to adjudicate Safadi's
2
application.
Safadi is not alone in experiencing an adjustment of status (AOS)
application delay. Dr. Xiaoqing Tang is a Chinese diabetes researcher at
the University of Kentucky.3 She lives in Lexington with her husband, Dr.
Guiliang Tang, and their daughter, Wendi. 4 In 2004, the family filed AOS
* J.D. Candidate, 2009, Fordham University School of Law. I would like to thank my
family, my friends, and Professor Robert Kaczorowski for all their support, patience, and
input.
1. Safadi v. Howard, 466 F. Supp. 2d 696, 697 (E.D. Va. 2006); see infra notes 86,
110-12 and accompanying text.
2. Safadi, 466 F. Supp. 2d at 697-98.
3. Guiliang Tang v. Chertoff, No. 07-203-JBC, 2007 WL 2462187, at *1 (E.D. Ky.
Aug. 29, 2007).

4. Id.
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applications to become permanent residents. 5 Three years later, Xiaoqing
Tang received a $300,000 research grant from the National Institutes of
Health, contingent on proof of her LPR status or evidence of meaningful
progress toward that end. 6 At that time, USCIS still was processing the
Tangs' applications, which were tied up in FBI name checks that, according
to a USCIS fact sheet submitted at trial,
take less than six months to
7
complete ninety-nine percent of the time.
The Tangs and Safadi are just four petitioners among thousands who
have tried-with mixed success-to compel USCIS to decide on (or
adjudicate) their AOS applications by filing original injunctive suits in
district courts under writ of mandamus and Administrative Procedure Act
(APA) theories. 8 The decision whether to adjust an applicant's status is at
the agency's discretion by law, 9 but plaintiffs argue that the agency has a
mandatory duty to conclude their applications--one way or anotherwithin a reasonable time. 10 USCIS's response to these suits has varied, but
in recent years, it has moved to have them dismissed based on lack of
jurisdiction. I I These jurisdictional challenges have created a split among
12
district courts over their power to hear plaintiffs' suits.

This Note examines the litigation commenced by AOS applicants and the
government's motions to have the cases dismissed. 13 It seeks to resolve the
following question: do federal courts have the authority to hear plaintiffs'
injunctive suits demanding agency action on significantly delayed AOS
applications? The answer turns on whether USCIS has a duty to adjudicate
applications properly before it, whether it must do so in a reasonably timely
manner, and whether any statutory provisions preclude federal courts from
asserting jurisdiction.
Part I begins with a discussion of AOS. It explains the adjustment
process and examines various institutional impediments to concluding
applications quickly. Part I then surveys recent government policies for
AOS applications and introduces the statutes and regulations governing the
process. Part II presents the conflict over whether to grant defendants'
motions to dismiss. First, it examines cases granting dismissal, including
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id. at *1 n.2.
8. Pamela A. MacLean, Immigrants Look to Speed Process: Suits to Compel Action on
Stalled Visas Split Courts, Nat'l L.J., July 16, 2007, at 1.
9. See 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a) (2000).
10. MacLean, supra note 8; see infra notes 120-22 and accompanying text.
11. MacLean, supra note 8.
12. Id.
13. This Note focuses only on adjustment of status (AOS) litigants who have met the
prerequisites for AOS, see infra notes 40-52 and accompanying text, and whose applications
are complete but for the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) name checks, see infra notes
72-80 and Part I.B.3. This Note addresses the success of AOS litigants in surviving motions
to dismiss, but not the merits of their individual cases. It also does not address any special
issues raised by habeas petitions, applications made in removal proceedings, or applications
for citizenship, among others.
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the legal and policy justifications for those decisions. Part II goes on to
evaluate the cases asserting jurisdiction and the reasons therefor. Part III
seeks to resolve the conflict by advocating the position taken by federal
courts declining the government's motions to dismiss. It argues that such a
position is the most faithful to the letter and intent of the relevant
immigration laws, the most workable, and best serves the issues underlying
the AOS process and broader policy concerns.
I. AN INTRODUCTION TO ADJUSTMENT OF STATUSAND ADJUSTMENT DELAYED

This part introduces AOS, the process that allows aliens living in the
United States to become LPRs. It takes a detailed look at the procedure
from applicant and agency perspectives and surveys recent government
policies with respect to AOS. This part goes on to examine the institutional
obstacles to timely application decisions that are at the heart of the
applicants' injunctive suits. Finally, it gives a brief background on those
suits, introducing the bases of litigants' claims and the statutes and
regulations creating conflict among federal district courts.
A. The Immigration and Nationality Act and
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services
Congress has plenary power in all matters pertaining to immigration and
the regulation of alien conduct. 14 Immigration policy was set by piecemeal
legislation until 1952, when Congress enacted the Immigration and
Nationality Act (INA),1 5 coordinating immigration law into one
comprehensive statute. 16 The INA has been amended many times, 17 but it
remains the foundation of U.S. immigration law.18
Over time, Congress delegated immigration enforcement and policy
implementation to various agencies in the executive branch. 19 The
Treasury Department administered immigration law until 1903, when those
14. H.R. Rep. No. 1365, at 1 (1952), reprinted in 1952 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1653, 1653-54;

see also Austin T. Fragomen, Jr. & Steven C. Bell, Immigration Fundamentals: A Guide to
Law and Practice § 1:2, at 3 (4th ed. 2007). Authority is implied by U.S. Constitution
Article I, Section 8, Clauses 3 and 4, and Section 9, Clause 1.
15. Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163
(codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1537 (2000)).
16. Immigration and Nationality Act, http://www.uscis.gov/portal/site/uscis (follow
"Laws and Regulations" hyperlink; then follow "Immigration and Nationality Act"
hyperlink) (last visited Feb. 17, 2008). While it is proper to refer to INA provisions as they
are codified within both the INA itself (e.g., INA § 245) and the U.S. Code (e.g., 8 U.S.C. §
1255), this Note uses the latter.
17. Id.; see also Fragomen & Bell, supra note 14, § 1:3, at 5-6; (detailing major reforms
in 1965 and 1976, new provisions on political asylum and refugees in 1980, the Immigration
Reform and Control Act of 1986, the Immigration Act of 1990, the Illegal Immigration
Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, the USA PATRIOT Act, and the
Homeland Security Act).
18. David Weissbrodt, Immigration Law and Procedure: In a Nutshell 15 (4th ed. 1998).
19. Fragomen & Bell, supra note 14, § 1:2, at 4.
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20
duties were transferred to what would become the Department of Labor.
In 1940, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS)-as it had been
known since 1933-was moved to the
Department of Justice (DOJ), where
21
it stayed for more than sixty years.
In the Homeland Security Act of 2002, Congress transferred the INS
again, this time to the newly formed Department of Homeland Security
(DHS), effective March 1, 2003.22 The Homeland Security Act nominally
abolished the INS and split its functions into three immigration-related
bureaus: USCIS, Information and Customs Enforcement (ICE), and
Customs and Border Protection (CBP). 23
Except where otherwise
specified, the Homeland Security Act vested the exclusive authority to
administer and enforce all immigration and naturalization law with the
secretary of Homeland Security. 24 INS enforcement functions such as
25
border security and inspections were split between CBP and ICE. USCIS

assumed responsibility for immigration benefits and applications, such as
those for naturalization and those to change or adjust status. 26 The last of
these is the topic of this Note, and the next section explains fully the
process of adjusting status.
B. Immigratingfrom Within: Adjusting to Lawful
PermanentResident Status
The INA presumes that aliens 27 entering the United States intend to do so
permanently-as "immigrants" 28-unless
they fit into specified
nonimmigrant classes. 2 9 Unlike immigrants, nonimmigrants enter the
United States for a limited time and purpose. 30 AOS is the process
allowing nonimmigrants already physically present in the United States to
"adjust" their immigration statuses to LPR, 31 essentially immigrating from
within. 32 AOS is an alternative to consular processing, the more traditional
20. Thomas Alexander Aleinikoff et al., Immigration: Process and Policy 101 n.2 (3d
ed. 1995).
21. See id.
22. Noel L. Griswold, Forgetting the Melting Pot: An Analysis of the Department of
Homeland Security Takeover of the INS, 39 Suffolk U. L. Rev. 207, 221 (2005).
23. Fragomen & Bell, supra note 14, § 1:2, at 4.
24. 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a), (g) (2000 & Supp. V 2005).
25. Fragomen & Bell, supra note 14, § 1:4, at 20.
26. Id.
27. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(3) (2000) (defining aliens as persons who are not U.S. citizens or
U.S. nationals).
28. How Do I Get an Immigrant Visa Number?, http://www.uscis.gov/greencard (follow
"Application Procedures: Becoming a Permanent Resident While in the United States"
hyperlink; then follow "How Do I Get an Immigrant Visa Number?" hyperlink) (last visited
Feb. 17, 2008).
29. Jain v. INS, 612 F.2d 683, 686 (2d Cir. 1979); see 8 U.S.C. § 1 101(a)(15).
30. Jain, 612 F.2d at 686.
31. Lawful permanent resident (LPR) status means "having been lawfully accorded the
privilege of residing permanently in the United States as an immigrant in accordance with
the immigration laws, such status not having changed." 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(20).
32. See Elkins v. Moreno, 435 U.S. 647, 667 (1978).
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process requiring aliens to apply at U.S. consulates overseas before entering
the United States. 33 AOS is codified in the 1NA, at 8 U.S.C. § 1255, 34
which gives the attorney general the discretionary power to grant qualified
35
applicants LPR status.
The benefits of permanent status-as opposed to that of nonimmigrantare many. Permanent residents have the right to travel overseas freely and
to petition for close family members' immigration. 36 Permanent residents
also are not required to have actual dwellings in the United States. Thus,
they may leave the country for prolonged periods without relinquishing
their status, so long as they intend to remain residents. 3 7 Permanent
resident status is also a requisite step in the path to U.S. citizenship. 3 8
1. First Steps to Adjusting to Lawful Permanent Resident Status:
Eligibility and Submitting Adjustment of Status Applications
This section introduces the steps an alien must take, and the requirements
he or she must meet, to adjust status and join the group of approximately
one million new permanent residents USCIS approves each year. 39 For
most applicants, the process begins by obtaining USCIS approval of an
immigrant petition, 40 usually in one of the three major categories of
immigrant visas: family sponsored, employment based, or diversity. 4 1
33. 1 Am. Immigration Law. Assoc., Immigration & Nationality Law Handbook 229
(Randy P. Auerbach et al. eds., 2003-2004) [hereinafter Immigration Handbook]. Foreign
nationals may prefer AOS to consular processing because
(1) it avoids the expense and inconvenience of travel to the home country, (2) AOS
applicants, including dependent family members, are entitled to employment
authorization and permission to travel while the AOS application is pending, (3)
employment-based AOS applicants receive job mobility (i.e., "portability")
benefits. . . , and (4) there are more options for reconsideration of an unfavorable
decision by [USCIS].
Id.
34. The regulations at 8 C.F.R. § 245.1-. 11 (2006) govern eligibility and procedure for
applications.
35. USCIS Instructions for Supplement A to Form 1-485, Adjustment of Status Under
Section 245(i) (OMB No. 1615-0023) 1 (2007) [hereinafter Supplement A Instructions],
available at http://www.uscis.gov/files/form/i-485supainstr.pdf. While § 1255 refers only to
the attorney general, the authority to adjust status was transferred to the Homeland Security
secretary and his USCIS delegate in 2003. See supra note 24 and accompanying text. This
Note follows many cases in referring to "USCIS." See 6 U.S.C. § 557 (Supp. V 2005).
36. Singh v. Still, 470 F. Supp. 2d 1064, 1070 (N.D. Cal. 2006).
37. Fragomen & Bell, supra note 14, § 1:5.4, at 35.
38. Ngwanyia v. Ashcroft, 302 F. Supp. 2d 1076, 1079-80 (D. Minn. 2004).
39. Audrey Hudson, U.S. Faces Lawsuit on Citizenship Delays: Security Checks Take
Many Years, Wash. Times, Feb. 9, 2007, at A 11.
40. See 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a) (2000); USCIS, How Do I Become a Lawful Permanent
Resident While in the United States?, http://www.uscis.gov/greencard (follow "How Do I
Become a Permanent Resident While in the United States?" hyperlink) (last visited Jan. 31,

2008).
41. Fragomen & Bell, supra note 14, § 1:6, at 36; see also USCIS Instructions for 1-485,
Application to Register for Permanent Residence or Adjust Status (OMB No. 1615-0023) 12 (2007) [hereinafter 1-485 Instructions], available at http://www.uscis.gov/files/form/i485instr.pdf. Within each of these three categories, visa allotment is broken down further by
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Next, an immigrant visa number must be "immediately available" to an
applicant. 42 After that, an applicant must apply to adjust to permanent
resident status using a form provided by USCIS called "Form 1-485,
Application to Register Permanent Residence or Adjust Status. ' 43 With
certain exceptions, an a qualified applicant must have been admitted or
paroled to the United States 4 5 and must be physically located within its
borders. 4 6 An applicant also must be admissible for permanent residence,
must have maintained lawful nonimmigrant status, 47 engaged only in
authorized8 employment, and must not be ineligible for AOS under §
4
1255(C).

Generally, applicants must submit the following items with their 1-485
forms: (1) documentation of any criminal history, (2) a copy of the
applicant's birth certificate, (3) copies of any nonimmigrant visas obtained
in the last year, (4) two passport photos, (5) a biographic information sheet,
(6) a medical examination report, (7) evidence of eligibility for the category

"preference" categories for various types of applications and again by native country. 8
U.S.C. § 1153; Fragomen & Bell, supra note 14, § 1:6, at 36, 42-43. For a more detailed
discussion of the preference system, see Fragomen & Bell, supra note 14, § 1.6. Sometimes,
applicants may establish with USCIS their eligibility for one of the preference categories
while simultaneously applying for AOS. See id. § 2:1.2, at 9. Determining visa eligibility is
not an issue considered in this Note, but for a discussion of the eligibility determination
procedures, see id. § 2:1.2 (employment procedures), § 3:1.2 (family-based procedures), and
§ 4:2 (diversity procedures).
42. 1-485 Instructions, supra note 41, at 1. Yearly numerical caps govern allotments to
the various preference categories. See Fragomen & Bell, supra note 14, §§ 1:3.2, 1:6.
Family-sponsored immigrant visas are capped at 480,000 annually; employment-based visas
at 140,000; and diversity visas at 55,000. Id. § 1:6, at 36. Refugee and asylee visas are "not
included in the annual cap" and are established by a separate annual allocation. Id. For
immediate relatives of American citizens, visas are always deemed to be "immediately
available," despite the caps. Id. § 2:10.2, at 124. For most applicants, however, visas are
distributed chronologically, based on cutoff dates for the current processing of immigrant
visa applications in each preference category. Id. LPR applicants with a spot on the waiting
list before the cutoff date for their category have a visa "immediately available" to them. Id.
Aliens with "immediately available" visas generally have one year from the date of
notification to apply for an immigrant visa. 8 U.S.C. § 1153(g).
43. 1-485 Instructions, supra note 41, at 1.
44. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1255(g)-(i); 8 C.F.R. §§ 245.1(a), 245.8 (2007).
45. 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a); 8 C.F.R. § 245.1(b)(3). "Admitted" or "admission" means,
"with respect to an alien, the lawful entry of the alien into the United States after inspection
and authorization by an immigration officer." 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(A) (2000). "Paroled"
is the term used to describe the attorney general's decision to let "into the United States
temporarily under such conditions as he may prescribe only on a case-by-case basis for
urgent humanitarian reasons or significant public benefit any alien applying for admission to
the United States." Id. § 1182(d)(5)(A). A parole is not an admission. Id. § 1101(a)(13)(B).
46. 8 C.F.R. § 245.1(a).
47. Supplement A Instructions, supra note 35, at 1. Certain exceptions to this
requirement exist. For more information on these exceptions, see Fragomen & Bell, supra
note 14, § 2:10.2[A], at 121-23.
48. Supplement A Instructions, supra note 35, at 1. Section 1255(c) concerns "[a]lien
crewmen, aliens continuing or accepting unauthorized employment, and aliens admitted in
transit without visa." 8 U.S.C. § 1255(c).
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under which the applicant applies, 49 and (8) filing fees, including a $930
processing fee 50 and a $80 biometrics fee. 51 In some cases, applicants must
also submit a police clearance, an affidavit of support, and/or an
employment letter. 52 Following the initial filing, applicants are generally
required to appear for biometric examinations and submit to background
checks.5 3 AOS is "a matter of grace, not right," 54 but applications
satisfying
the criteria described above usually succeed in winning LPR
55
status.
2. On the Inside: Adjustment of Status Application Processing
This section details the AOS process from the agency's perspective. The
process is case sensitive and heavily regulated, but the basic elements are
the same for each application. First, USCIS issues the applicant a receipt as
proof of filing. 56 It then checks for completeness of the 1-485 form and
other information submitted.57 The form must establish the applicant's
eligibility for immigration benefits, and if it does not, USCIS may deny the
application, request more information from the applicant, 58 or send the
applicant a "Notice of Intent to Deny"59 to afford him an opportunity to
respond to the evidence meriting denial.
USCIS requests most eligible applicants to appear for an interview at an
agency office. 60 An applicant between the ages of fourteen and eighty must
pass various background and security checks-including an FBI name
check, FBI fingerprint check, and Interagency Border Inspection System
(IBIS) check-to ensure that he has disclosed any criminal history and does
not pose security risks. 6 1 Ordinarily, the checks must be complete before a

49. All of the preference categories mentioned at supra note 41 have various and
individual approval procedures.
50. USCIS, USCIS Ombudsman 2007 Annual Report 47 (2007). Until mid-2007, the
fee for AOS applications was $325. Id.
51. 1-485 Instructions, supra note 41, at 3-5. Applicants adjusting status under § 1255(i)
must also submit Supplement A to Form 1-485 and an additional $1000 fee. See Supplement
A Instructions, supra note 35, at 1.
52. 1-485 Instructions, supra note 41, at 3-4.
53. Id. at 3. For a discussion of the FBI background checks, see infra notes 61-80 and
accompanying text.
54. Elkins v. Moreno, 435 U.S. 647, 667 (1978).
55. See In re Arai, 13 I. & N. Dec. 494, 496 (B.I.A. 1970).
56. Immigration Handbook, supra note 33, at 233.
57. 1-485 Instructions, supra note 41, at 8.
58. 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(b)(8) (2007); Rules and Regulations: Removal of the Standardized
Request for Evidence Processing Timeframe, 72 Fed. Reg. 19,093, 19,100 (Apr. 17, 2007)
(to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pts. 103, 204, 214, 245, 245(a)).
Removal of the Standardized Request for Evidence
59. Rules and Regulations:
Processing Timeframe, 72 Fed. Reg. at 19,100.
60. 1-485 Instructions, supra note 41, at 8; see 8 C.F.R. § 245.6.
61. See Saleem v. Keisler, 520 F. Supp. 2d 1048, 1949-50 (W.D. Wis. 2007); Safadi v.
Howard, 466 F. Supp. 2d 696, 697 (E.D. Va. 2006).
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final decision is possible, 62 although new USCIS policies may change
63
that.
The IBIS is a watch-listing system-an electronic warehouse of over a
billion records64 from more than twenty federal intelligence and law
enforcement agencies, including the FBI, Department of State, the Central
Intelligence Agency, CBP, and other DHS agencies. 65 An IBIS check
usually returns information "immediately" 66 on businesses, vehicles, and
67
individuals suspected of or involved in illegal activities.
USCIS also checks an applicant's fingerprints. 68 In fiscal year 2006, the
FBI ran print checks on more than three million fingerprints for USCIS, at a
cost to USCIS of over $48.8 million. 69 Results are usually available in a
day or two 70 and remain valid for fifteen months. 7 1
Most 1-485 applications require a definitive name check. 72 The FBI
National Name Check Program conducts these checks for a fee and
according to USCIS standards. 73 The FBI does not rule on name checks;
rather, it provides the information to USCIS for its adjudication process. 74
To perform the checks, the FBI combs through law enforcement agencies'
more than eighty-six million investigative files, 75 and any other criminal,
personnel, administrative, or applicant files. 76 The FBI runs the check
using an applicant's name and date of birth. 77 In doing so, the FBI runs
combinations of some or all of the applicant's first, last, and middle names,

62. Saleem, 520 F. Supp. 2d at 1050.
63. See infra notes 132-34 and accompanying text.
64. Review
of
the
Terrorist
Screening
Centers,
http://www.usdoj.gov/oig/reports/FBI/aO527/chapter2.htm (last visited Feb. 10, 2008).
65. Xin Liu v. Chertoff, No. Civ. S-06-2808 RRB EFB, 2007 WL 2433337, at *1 n.3
(E.D. Cal. Aug. 22, 2007).
66. See id. at *5.
67. See Review of the Terrorist Screening Centers, supra note 64.
68. 1-485 Instructions, supra note 41, at 3.
69. USCIS, supra note 50, at 57.
70. Xin Liu, 2007 WL 2433337, at *5.
71. USCIS, supra note 50, at 58.
72. Interoffice Memorandum from Michael L. Aytes, Assoc. Dir., Domestic Operations,
USCIS, FBI Name Checks Policy and Process Clarification for Domestic Operations 2 (Dec.
21,
2006)
[hereinafter
FBI
Name
Checks
Memo],
available
at
www.ailf.org/lac/lac-mandamus-aytesmemo.pdf.
73. USCIS, supra note 50, at 38.
74. FBI, National Name
Check
Program-Frequently
Asked Questions,
http://www.fbi.gov/page2/nationalnamecheck.htm (last visited Feb. 17, 2008). The checks
"are not conducted by the FBI as part of ongoing investigations or from a need to learn more
about an individual because of any threat or risk perceived by the FBI." USCIS, supra note
50, at 38.
75. Spencer S. Hsu & N.C. Aizenman, FBIName Check Cited in NaturalizationDelays:
Official Calls Backlog "Unacceptable," Wash. Post, June 17, 2007, at Al.
76. Xin Liu v. Chertoff, No. Civ. S-06-2808 RRB EFB, 2007 WL 2433337, at *1 n.3
(E.D. Cal. Aug. 22, 2007).
77. FBI Name Checks Memo, supra note 72, at 2. Occasionally, the FBI uses the place
of birth where cases "are returned with an initial response of 'pending."' Id. at 3. Alien
Registration Numbers are not used in the name check process. Id.
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as well as phonetic variations and similar spellings. 78 Additionally, they
run automatic variations on the applicant's date of birth, searching the entire
birth year. 79 Like fingerprint checks, name checks are valid for fifteen
months. 80
Once the application is complete, USCIS makes a decision whether to
grant LPR status, and applicants receive notifications of these decisions by
mail. 8 1 Denial notifications include the reasons therefor 82 and generally
may not be appealed. 83 Applicants retain the right, however, to renew their
applications in any84removal proceedings that ensue after they are initially
denied LPR status.
3. Bureaucratic Hiccups: Waiting for an Outcome
Neither the INA nor its regulations set out a time frame for the
application and security processes just described, 85 but ninety-nine percent
86
of the time the entire AOS process takes less than six months.
Nevertheless, many applicants find themselves in a "bureaucratic
nightmare," waiting years for a decision. 87 The delay has several causes,
but in recent years, unresolved FBI name checks have been its chief
source, 88 and a new89processing backlog is likely to be a further obstacle to
timely adjudication.
FBI name checks usually are not problematic. About sixty-eight percent
return no identifiable information on an individual within forty-eight to
seventy-two hours. 90 Ninety percent of the name checks clear with "no
record" within sixty days, 9 1 and overall less than one percent of the 1.5

78. Id. at 2-3.
79. Id. at 3. Because of the variations in FBI searches both with respect to name and
date of birth, misspellings, alias names, and discrepancies within the day and month of an
applicant's submission do not warrant resubmission of the checks. Id.
80. Id. at 4.
81. 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(b)(19) (2007).
82. Id. § 245.2(a)(5).
83. Id. § 245.2(a)(5)(ii).
84. Id. For more on removal proceedings, see id. § 240. Denied applicants may also
reapply for immigrant visas in their home countries. Aleinikoff et al., supra note 20, at 441.
85. See 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a) (2000) (mentioning no time frame); 8 C.F.R. § 245 (same).
86. Guiliang Tang v. Chertoff, No. 07-203-JBC, 2007 WL 2462187, at *1 n.2 (E.D. Ky.
Aug. 29, 2007). But see infra note 112 and accompanying text.
87. Paunescu v. INS, 76 F. Supp. 2d 896, 902 (N.D. Ill. 1999).
88. USCIS, supra note 50, at iv; see, e.g., Yazbek v. Chertoff, No. 07-12566, 2007 WL
2875462, at *1 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 1, 2007); Guiliang Tang, 2007 WL 2462187, at *1.
Fingerprint and IBIS checks usually return results in a matter of days, if not minutes. USCIS,
supra note 50, at 38; see supra notes 66, 70 and accompanying text.
89. See infra notes 105-12 and accompanying text.
90. Guangming Liu v. Chertoff, No. 06-3297, 2007 WL 1202961, at *2 (C.D. Ill. Apr.
23, 2007).
91. Ma v. Gonzales (Ma II), No. C07-122RSL, 2007 WL 2743395, at *2 (W.D. Wash.
Sept. 17, 2007).
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million names USCIS92submits each year are ultimately linked to potentially
negative information.
Nevertheless, the USCIS ombudsman called FBI name check delays the
"single biggest obstacle" to timely application processing in his yearly
report. 93 Before the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 (9/11), the FBI
processed about 2.5 million name check requests each year. 94 Since then,
the checks have been intensified and are now run "not only against the list
of individuals under investigation by the FBI but also against the list of
those named in investigative files for any reason. '95 Pursuant to this
change in policy, USCIS resubmitted 2.7 million names for reexamination
96
at the end of 2002-and the FBI is only recently getting through them.
The resubmission contributed to a name check backlog that continues to
saddle the FBI. The backlog has doubled in size since 2005, 9 7 even 98though
in 2006 alone the FBI processed more than 3.4 million name checks.
Each week, the FBI receives over 62,000 name check requests, 27,000 of
which come from USCIS. 9 9 In May 2007, USCIS had 329,160 name
checks pending with the FBI, approximately sixty-four percent of which
had been stalled for more than ninety days, thirty-two percent for more than
one year,' 00 and seventeen percent for more than two years. 10 1 Of these,
31,144 have been pending for more than thirty-three months-roughly
10,000 more such checks than in 2006.102
Institutional issues at USCIS compound the FBI name check problem
and are another source of delayed application decisions. The agency "has
long been criticized as a slow and confounding bureaucracy."' 1 3 It is
chronically underresourced 10 4 and has a processing backlog that is
"different from the visa backlogs that have burdened the United States
92. Id.
93. USCIS, supra note 50, at 37.
94. GuangmingLiu, 2007 WL 1202961, at *1.
95. Hsu and Aizenman, supranote 75.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. GuangmingLiu, 2007 WL 1202961, at *1.
99. FBI, supra note 74.
100. USCIS Ombudsman, 2007 Annual Report Highlights 2 (2007) [hereinafter
Ombudsman
2007
Highlights],
available
at
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/cisomb-annualrpt07_June 11_2007_highlights.pdf.
101. Hsu & Aizenman, supra note 75.
102. Ombudsman 2007 Highlights, supra note 100, at 2.
103. Julia Preston, Legal Immigrants Facing a Longer Wait, N.Y. Times, Jan. 18, 2008,
at A13.
104. USCIS is funded primarily by user fees and does not receive regular congressional
appropriations. USCIS,supra note 50, at 47. In 2001, however, Congress approved a $500
million package to help the agency reduce its backlog. Stephen Dinan, Immigration Reduces
Big Backlog: Will Meet Six-Month Goal in October, Official Says, Wash. Times, Sept. 16,
2006, at Al. Another $160 million came in 2005. Press Release, DHS, Fact Sheet:
Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act of 2005 (Oct. 18, 2004), available at
http://www.dhs.gov/xnews/releases/press-release_0541.shtm.

By March 2007, the backlog

was down to around 1.3 million, but USCIS needed more funds to maintain its reduction
efforts. USCIS,supra note 50, at 11-12; see Dinan, supra.
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immigration for years."' 10 5 Processing backlogs arise when USCIS falls
"behind on the bureaucratic work of logging in applications and deciding
whether to grant visas,"' 06 and they leave many applicants waiting months
107
just to receive initial application receipts.
In early 2007, then-USCIS Director Emilio Gonzalez announced a fee
increase for immigration applications of all kinds-and a hike of nearly
150% for AOS application processing 08-effective
July 30.109
He
promised the agency would use the new funds to prevent future backlogs
and reduce the waiting time for permanent resident visas from six to four
months by the end of 2008.110 The prospect of higher fees, however,
precipitated a deluge of more than three million applications for
immigration benefits of all kinds that Gonzalez called "unprecedented in the
history of immigration services of our nation."'11 1 Gonzalez now estimates
that until 2010, permanent residency applications that used to take six
months or less to process will take about a year." 12
C. Addressing the Long, Long Wait
As Part I.B explained, uncompleted name checks have been the primary
source of application delay in recent years. Recently implemented policy
changes could remedy that, 1 3 but the practicability of those changes
remains to be tested, and a new processing backlog 114 could frustrate timely
adjudication efforts. Regardless of their source, delays significantly affect
AOS applicants' lives. Many of them cannot travel abroad to visit their
families because they would not be permitted to reenter the United
States."I 5 In the course of waiting, the labor certifications underlying
employment-based applications may be invalidated by changes in
105. Julia Preston, Surge Brings New Immigration Backlog, N.Y. Times, Nov. 23, 2007,

at A26; see also sources cited supra note 42.
106. Preston, supra note 105.

107. See id. Initial receipts are the first step in AOS application processing. See supra
note 56 and accompanying text. For example, the USCIS Ombudsman wrote in his 2007
report that "USCIS' inability to process enough green card applications and accurately track
employment-based green card applications has resulted in a perpetual backlog of
employment-based green card applications." USCIS, supra note 50, at iv. USCIS does not
include in its backlog the 155,592 cases pending more than six months due to FBI name
checks. Id. at 37.
108. Bob Egelko & Matthai Chakko Kuruvila, Faced with Lawsuit, U.S. Finally Grants
Residency to Immigrants, S.F. Chron., Feb. 9, 2007, at B2.
109. Preston, supra note 103. As of the publication of this Note, a successor had not been
named to Emilio Gonzalez's position. See Julia Preston, Top Immigration Official to Resign

in April, N.Y. Times, Mar. 14, 2008, at A22 (indicating that Emilio Gonzalez had announced
his resignation).
110. See Preston, supra note 103.
111. Id.; see also Editorial, Citizenship Blues, N.Y. Times, Feb. 17, 2008, at WKI 1

("[T]he agency is drowning in applications from people who filed before the [fee] increase to
avoid being gouged.").
112. Preston, supra note 103.

113. See infra notes 132-35 and accompanying text.
114. See supra notes 105-12 and accompanying text.

115. See Hsu & Aizenman, supra note 75.
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applicants' duties and responsibilities.' 16 Applicants may also lose job
opportunities that require them to be permanent residents. 117 Other
problems arise in purchasing property, qualifying for in-state tuition, and
obtaining drivers' licenses, federal grants and funds, credit, and student
loans. 118 Furthermore, delay postpones the naturalization process, which
requires applicants to have had LPR status for five years.ll 9
In the face of these problems, frustrated applicants have increasingly
taken their cases to court, filing suits to force the government to act on their
stalled applications.' 2 0 Applicants generally argue that they have a right to
a decision in a reasonable time and assert their claims based on the APA
and the Mandamus and Venue Act (MVA). 121 They typically claim that
one or all of the U.S. attorney general, DHS, FBI, USCIS and its local
directors, and DOJ have unreasonably delayed their duty to adjudicate AOS
applications. 122 Part I.C.1, below, details USCIS's vacillating position
regarding these injunctive suits.
Part I.C.2 introduces the statutes
underlying plaintiffs' claims, the MVA and the APA. Finally, Part I.C.3
presents the INA provisions and implementing regulations at the heart of
the conflict over whether to grant government motions to dismiss.

116. Fragomen & Bell, supra note 14, § 2:10.1.
117. USCIS, supra note 50, at 39.
118. Id.
119. Xin Liu v. Chertoff, No. Civ. S-06-2808 RRB EFB, 2007 WL 2433337, at *6 n.13
(E.D. Cal. Aug. 22, 2007) (citing Singh v. Still, 470 F. Supp. 2d 1064, 1070 (N.D. Cal.
2006)).
120. See supra note 8 and accompanying text; see also infra note 130 and accompanying
text.
121. The plaintiffs have also sued under the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201
(2000), but courts agree that § 2201 "does not provide an avenue of relief for.., plaintiffs."
Zalmout v. Gonzalez, No. 07-12575, 2007 WL 3121532, at *2 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 24, 2007);
accord Yong Tang v. Chertoff, 493 F. Supp. 2d 148, 151 (D. Mass. 2007).
122. See, e.g., Ma v. Gonzales (Ma II), No. C07-122RSL, 2007 WL 2743395, at *3, 4
(W.D. Wash. Sept. 17, 2007). Courts have held that since the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) "is the agency responsible for implementing the [INA] .... the only relevant
[d]efendant is... [the] Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security." Dmitriev v.
Chertoff, No. C 06-07677 JW, 2007 WL 1319533, at *4 (N.D. Cal. May 4, 2007). Thus,
they dismiss all other defendants, including the FBI and its director and the attorney general
and the Department of Justice. Id. at * 1, 4; accord Huang v. Chertoff, No. C 07-0277 JF,
2007 WL 1831105, at *3 (N.D. Cal. June 25, 2007). Other courts have similarly held that
since "USCIS is a division of the DHS," it was therefore a proper party. Konchitsky v.
Chertoff, No. C-07-00294 RMW, 2007 WL 2070325, at *6 (N.D. Cal. July 13, 2007);
accord Ma II, 2007 WL 2743395, at *3. A number of courts found that they lacked
"jurisdiction to compel the FBI to perform name checks in connection with adjustment of
status applications, reasoning that the FBI's involvement in processing name checks arises
not by statute or regulation, but by contract between USCIS and FBI." Ma II, 2007 WL
2743395, at *3; see also Mitova v. Chertoff, No. 07-2631, 2007 WL 4373045, at *6 (E.D.
Pa. Dec. 13, 2007); Konchitsky, 2007 WL 2070325, at *6.
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1. U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services Policy
for Delayed Applications
As part of its efforts to reduce the name check backlog described earlier,
USCIS issued a notice in January 2005 stating that it would request
expedited name checks for AOS and citizenship applicants with mandamus
lawsuits pending in federal court. 123 Although AOS applicants had utilized
124 USCIS's
mandamus in situations of delayed AOS adjudication before,
new policy prompted a wave of thousands of new suits from frustrated AOS
applicants. 125 In the past, immigration officials had challenged such suits,
moving to have the petitions dismissed for failure to state a claim for which
relief can be granted and/or lack of subject matter jurisdiction.126 Based on
the January 2005 policy, however, after suits were filed USCIS7 requested
2
that the FBI expedite the name checks, resolving cases quickly.1
Then, in December 2006, USCIS implemented a "first in, first out"
policy for name checks.128 The new policy provided that "[i]n the interest
of fairness and in processing cases chronologically mandamus filings are no
longer routinely treated expeditiously."' 129 Despite the agency's change of
course, frustrated applicants continued to file suits. 130 The government,
123. Notice, USCIS, FBI Name Check Expedite Criteria (Jan. 2005) [hereinafter Expedite
at
available
Criteria],
http://immigrationvoice.org/media/forums/iv/others/Exhibit5FBINamecheckexpeditecriteria.pdf,
see also MacLean, supra note 8. See generally infra Part I.C.2 and accompanying text.
USCIS also requested expedited name checks if an applicant could establish imminent
military deployment, "[a]ge-out benefits (not covered under the provision of the Child Status
Protection Act)," a grant of lawful permanent residence from an immigration judge, or
"[c]ompelling reasons as provided by the requesting office (i.e. critical medical condition)
assessed on a case by case basis." Expedite Criteria, supra.
124. See, e.g., Yu v. Brown, 36 F. Supp. 2d 922 (D.N.M. 1999); Agbemaple v. INS, No.
97 C 8547, 1998 WL 292441 (N.D. Ill. May 18, 1998); see also Nadler v. INS, 737 F. Supp.
658 (D.D.C. 1989).
125. MacLean, supra note 8; see also Emily Bazar, Immigrants Sue to Speed Citizenship:
Residents Tired of Long Delays in Background Checks Turn to Courts to Remove Barriers,
USA Today, Feb. 22, 2008, at 3A ("In 2005, about 270 lawsuits filed against USCIS were
over delayed name checks .... [In 2007], there were more than 4,400 such suits.").

126. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1), (6); see, e.g., Yu, 36 F. Supp. 2d at 926-27; Agbemaple,
1998 WL 292441, at *1.
127. MacLean, supra note 8.
128. Ma v. Gonzales (Ma II), No. C07-122RSL, 2007 WL 2743395, at *3 (W.D. Wash.
Sept. 17, 2007); FBI Name Checks Memo, supra note 72, at 5-6.
129. FBI Name Checks Memo, supra note 72, at 5-6; see also Update, USCIS, USCIS
Clarifies Criteria to Expedite FBI Name Check: Federal Litigation Removed as Sole Basis
to Expedite Check (Feb. 20, 2007) [hereinafter USCIS Expedited Name Check
at
available
Clarification],
the
(retaining
http://www.uscis.gov/files/pressrelease/ExpediteNameChk022007.pdf
expedite policy in limited situations but stating that USCIS "is no longer routinely requesting
the FBI to expedite a name check when the only reason for the request is that a mandamus
(or other federal petition) is filed in the case").
130. See Bazar, supra note 125. There has been a fourfold increase in suits against
USCIS since mid-2006. Hsu & Aizenman, supra note 75. Generally, AOS litigants have
waited two to five years between filing their applications and pursuing remedies in court.
See, e.g., Mitova v. Chertoff, No. 07-2631, 2007 WL 4373045, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 13,
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however, no longer responded by quickly concluding the applications, but
instead returned to its previous policy of challenging the claims. 131 These
challenges led to the fractured decisions that are the issue of this Note and
discussed in Part II. The courts are split as to whether they have the
authority to hear applicants' cases.
In February 2008, USCIS changed course once again. Now, if an LPR
application "has been in the system for more than six months and the only
missing piece is a name check by the F.B.I.,"'1 32 USCIS officials "shall
approve the ...[application] and proceed with card issuance."' 133 The new
policy provides that the name check will still be completed eventually and,
"[i]n the unlikely event" that it turns up negative information, USCIS may
cancel the visa and begin deportation proceedings. 134 The policy change,
however, does not resolve the question of whether federal courts have the
power to hear AOS applicants' injunctive suits-a question that may
become very important for applicants mired in USCIS's new processing
backlog or in the event that USCIS changes its policy again. Nor does the
new policy say whether USCIS will stop challenging applicants' suits.
Presumably, the suits will no longer be necessary when name checks are the
cause of delay, since those will be automatically expedited. Nevertheless,
immigration "officials are still reviewing how to implement the new
policy," and as of this Note's writing, officials135"could not say when they
will start issuing green cards from the backlog."'

2007) (three years); Korobkova v. Jenifer, Civil Case No. 07-11335, 2007 WL 3245178, at
* 1 (E.D. Mich. Nov. 2, 2007) (more than two years); Saleem v. Keisler, 520 F. Supp. 2d
1048, 1049 (W.D. Wis. 2007) (almost five years); Zalmout v. Gonzalez, No. 07-12575, 2007
WL 3121532, at *1 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 24, 2007) (four years); Gershenzon v. Gonzalez, No.
07-109, 2007 WL 2728535, at *1 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 17, 2007) (three years); Landry v.
Chertoff, No. 07-0506, 2007 WL 2007996, at *1 (E.D. La. July 5, 2007) (two and a half
years). But see, e.g., Houle v. Riding, No. CV-F-07-1266-LJO-GSA, 2008 WL 223670, at
*1 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 28, 2008) (less than two years); Ibrahim v. Chertoff, No. 06cv2071-L
(POR), 2007 WL 1558521, at *1 (S.D. Cal. May 25, 2007) (over seven years).
131. See MacLean, supra note 8; see, e.g., Ma II, 2007 WL 2743395, at *3. These cases
hinge on the courts' "resolution of the legal question whether the pace of [USCIS's]
adjudication [of AOS applications] lies within or outside the discretion of that agency.
Therefore, it is of no practical import" whether defendants move to dismiss under Rule
12(b)(1) or Rule 12(b)(6). He v. Chertoff, No. 07 C 363, 2008 WL 36634, at *2 (N.D. I11.
Jan. 2, 2008).
132. Julia Preston, Rules Eased to Expedite Green Card Applications, N.Y. Times, Feb.
12, 2008, at A12.
133. Interoffice Memorandum from Michael L. Aytes, Assoc. Dir., Domestic Operations,
USCIS, Revised National Security Adjudication and Reporting Requirements 2 (Feb. 4,
available
at
2008],
Aytes
Memo
[hereinafter
2008)
http://www.uscis.gov/files/pressrelease/DOC017.PDF.
134. Id. at 1.
135. Susan Carroll, Green Cards Will Go Out, Background Check or Not: Move Meant
to Ease Huge Backlog of Applicants, but Critics Warn It's a Threat to Security, Hous.
Chron., Feb. 12, 2008, at Al.
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2. Applicants Make a Federal Case of It
The following sections introduce the MVA and the APA, the statutes
upon which the vast majority of applicants have built their claims for relief.
a. The Mandamus and Venue Act
The common law remedy of mandamus was codified in the Mandamus
and Venue Act of 1962.136 Entitled "Action to compel an officer of the
United States to perform his duty," the statute grants federal courts
jurisdiction to compel government officials to carry out ministerial
duties. 137 The court's power to intervene depends on the nature of the
official's duty, 138 and relief "will
issue only to compel the performance of
'a clear nondiscretionary duty." ' 139 It is an "extraordinary remedy."' 140 To
win relief under the statute, a petitioner must establish that "(1) [his] claim
is clear and certain; (2) the official's duty is nondiscretionary, ministerial,
and so plainly prescribed as to be free from doubt, and (3) no other
14 1
adequate remedy is available."'
Mandamus actions have had mixed success in immigration. 142 In the
context of AOS applications, plaintiffs generally claim mandamus is proper
because USCIS has a plainly prescribed, nondiscretionary duty to make a
final decision on pending applications, and further that the agency's
significant delays make their claims clear and certain. 143
b. The Administrative ProcedureAct
The APA codified a "developing common law presumption in favor of
judicial review of administrative action."' 144 Its premise is that "[a] person
suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely affected or
aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute, is

136. Pub. L. No. 87-748, 76 Stat. 744 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1361 (2000)).
137. Id. ("The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any action in the nature of

mandamus to compel an officer or employee of the United States or any agency thereof to
perform a duty owed to the plaintiff.").
138. Work v. United States ex rel Rives, 267 U.S. 175, 177 (1925).
139. Pittston Coal Group v. Sebben, 488 U.S. 105, 121 (1988) (quoting Heckler v.
Ringer, 466 U.S. 602, 616 (1984)).

140. Id.
141. Patel v. Reno, 134 F.3d 929, 931 (9th Cir. 1997).
142. See AILF Legal Action Ctr., Mandamus Actions: "How to" and Summary of
Relevant Case Law, in Immigration Handbook, supra note 33, at 61, 65 (surveying areas of
immigration law other than AOS where the plaintiff alleged that the defendant had a
nondiscretionary duty to act).

143. See infra Part II.B.5.b. The plaintiffs seek to compel the adjudication of their AOS
applications, but not the substance of that decision, which is explicitly left to agency
discretion. See 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a) (2000).
144. Cynthia Tripi, Availability of Judicial Review of Administrative Action, 55 Geo.

Wash. L. Rev. 729, 729 (1986).

2526

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 76

entitled to judicial review thereof." 14 5 A "reviewing court shall ... compel
agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed. ' 146 "[A]gency
action" is "the whole or a part of an agency rule, order, license, sanction,
relief, or the equivalent or denial thereof, or failure to act." 14 7 A "failure to
act" is a failure to take a discrete, required action. 148 To make a case under
the statute, plaintiffs must establish "(1) a clear duty owed to him or her by
the agency; (2) a duty which is mandatory and not discretionary; and (3) a
clear right to relief."' 14 9 To establish subject matter jurisdiction, however, a
plaintiff needs to show only "that a defendant (1) had a nondiscretionary
150
duty to act, and (2) unreasonably delayed in acting on that duty."'
The judicial review provisions of the APA have applied to the INA since
the INA's enactment in 1952.151 Plaintiffs in AOS suits ground their claims
challenging application delays in § 555(b), which commands that "[w]ith
due regard for the convenience and necessity of the parties or their
representatives and within a reasonable time, each agency shall proceed to
conclude a matter presented to it."'152 The case law does not clearly indicate
which party bears the burden of proving the reasonableness or
unreasonableness of a delay.' 5 3 Nor is "unreasonable delay" conclusively
where
defined, although the circuit courts have found that it can exist even
154
action.
agency
for
timeline
a
specify
not
does
statute
the relevant

The
145. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2000); see also Tripi, supra note 144, at 729-30.
Administrative Procedure Act (APA) does not supply independent subject matter
jurisdiction. Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99, 105-07 (1977). Courts typically derive the
authority to review agency action from the federal question statute. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331
(2000) ("The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under
the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States."); Tripi, supra note 144, at 730 n.3.
146. 5 U.S.C. § 706(1).
147. Id. § 551(13).
148. Norton v. S. Utah Wilderness Alliance, 542 U.S. 55, 62-63 (2004).
149. Yu v. Brown, 36 F. Supp. 2d 922, 930 (D.N.M. 1999) (citing Hemandez-Avalos v.
INS, 50 F.3d 842, 844 (10th Cir. 1995)). Unlike relief under the mandamus statute, the APA
does not require exhaustion of other remedies unless a statute mandates it or there is no
provision for staying an administrative decision pending an administrative appeal. H. Ronald
Klasko & Geoffrey Forney, Federal Court Litigation to Remedy Agency Delays 3 (2007),
available at www.klaskolaw.com/library/files/federa-l.pdf (citing Darby v. Cisneros, 509
U.S. 137, 153-54 (1993)).
150. Xin Liu v. Chertoff, No. Civ. S-06-2808 RRB EFB, 2007 WL 2433337, at *3 (E.D.
Cal. Aug. 22, 2007) (citing Norton, 542 U.S. at 63-65); see also Singh v. Still, 470 F. Supp.
2d 1064, 1067 (N.D. Cal. 2006) (citing 5 U.S.C. § 555(b)).
151. See Gerald Seipp, Federal Court Jurisdiction to Review Immigration Decisions: A
Tug of War between the Three Branches [07-04] Immigr. Briefings (West) 3 (Apr. 2007).
152. 5 U.S.C. § 555(b).
153. See Saleem v. Keisler, 520 F. Supp. 2d 1048, 1059 (W.D. Wis. 2007); see also id.
(reviewing the case law and assigning the burden to the defendants because they had the best
access to the information regarding the delay and adjustment applications).
154. Frey v. EPA, 403 F.3d 828, 834 (7th Cir. 2005) (expressing doubt, in dicta, that the
agency should be protected from review "as long as [the agency] has any notion that it
might, some day, take further unspecified action"); Saleem, 520 F. Supp. 2d at 1058 (finding
unreasonable delay possible "even if the 'agency has no concrete deadline establishing a date
by which it must act' (quoting Forest Guardians v. Babbitt, 164 F.3d 1261, 1271 (10th Cir.
1998))).

2008]

WAITING IN IMMIGRATION LIMBO

2527

The APA sets out two exceptions to general principles in favor of
review, 155 both of which are important to the availability of the APA in
AOS litigation. 156 First, § 701(a)(1) forecloses review where a statute
specifically precludes it.1 57 To satisfy § 701 (a)(1), Congress must provide
"clear and convincing evidence" of its intention to preclude review 158
through either the language or construction of the relevant statute. 159 The
statute's "scheme, objectives, legislative history, and [the] nature of the
administrative action involved are valid indicators of intent to preclude
judicial review," 1 60 so long as congressional
intent to do so is "fairly
16 1
discernible in the statutory scheme."'
Second, § 701(a)(2) forbids review if an agency's action is committed to
its discretion by law.162 It encompasses situations where the statute at issue
provides "no meaningful standard against which to judge the agency's
exercise of discretion."' 16 3 In these "rare"' 164 situations, "'the statute ("law")
can be taken to have "committed" the decisionmaking to the agency's
judgment absolutely. "'165

c. The Mandamus and Venue Act
and the Administrative ProcedureAct?
While APA and mandamus remedies are "technically distinct[,] ... relief
is identical under either statute." 1 6 6 Thus, in recent years, "the Supreme
Court has run together challenges to agency delay under the APA with the
traditional mandamus requirements."' 167 It has held that APA claims can
only go forward "where the plaintiff asserts that 'an agency failed to take a
discrete agency action that it is required to take.' These requirements
reflect the traditional mandamus 'ministerial' element which normally
limits the court's power to compel precise and definite acts over which an
16 8
agency official has no discretion."'
155. See infra notes 180-84 and accompanying text.
156. 5 U.S.C. § 701(a).

157. The full text of § 701(a)(1) reads, "This chapter applies, according to the provisions
thereof, except to the extent that-(1) statutes preclude judicial review .... See also Zheng
v. Reno, 166 F. Supp. 2d 875, 878 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
158. Shah v. Hansen, No. 1:07 CV 1576, 2007 WL 3232353, at *4 (N.D. Ohio Oct. 31,
2007) (quoting Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 141 (1967)).
159. Tripi, supra note 144, at 732 (citing Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 828 (1985)).
160. Id.
161. Id. at 733 (quoting Ass'n Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 157
(1970)).
162. 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2) (2000). The full text of the provision reads, "This chapter
applies, according to the provisions thereof, except to the extent that- ... (2) agency action
is committed to agency discretion by law." Id.
163. Heckler,470 U.S. at 830.

164. Lincoln v. Vigil, 508 U.S. 182, 191 (1993).
165. Id. (quoting Heckler, 470 U.S. at 830).
166. Landry v. Chertoff, No. 07-0506, 2007 WL 2007996, at *2 n.4 (E.D. La. July 5,
2007) (citing Indep. Mining Co. v. Babbitt, 105 F.3d 502, 507 (9th Cir. 1997)).
167. Klasko & Forney, supra note 149, at 10.
168. Id. (quoting Norton v. S. Utah Wilderness Alliance, 542 U.S. 55, 63-64 (2004)).
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3. Sources of Conflict in the Immigration and Nationality Act
The chief sources of conflict in AOS applicants' APA and mandamus
cases stem from different interpretations of two INA provisions. The first is
the meaning of the word "discretion" in § 1255(a); the second is the
preclusionary language found in § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii). This section unpacks
the language and some of the ambiguities of those two provisions and other
relevant sections of the INA and its implementing regulations.
a. The "Discretionary"Authority to Adjust Status: 8 U.S. C. § 1255(a)
Congress enacted § 1255(a) in 1952 so that "aliens would not inevitably
be required to leave the country and apply to a United States consul in order
to obtain permanent-resident status." 169 Section 1255(a) gives USCIS the
discretionary authority to adjust eligible applicants' status to that of legal
permanent resident 170 and sets out AOS applicant requirements. 7 1 Courts
disagree on what else § 1255(a) captures in its "discretion," aside from the
actual decision whether or not to grant AOS. Specifically, they dispute
whether it captures everything leading up to that decision, or only certain
elements, such as active steps in the process. The competing approaches
are discussed in Part 11.172
b. PrecludingJudicialReview: 8 U.S. C. § 1252(a)(2) (B) (i)
Despite the INA section's name, "Judicial review of orders of
removal," 173 most courts have taken a broad view of its applicability,
particularly with respect to § 1252(a)(2)(B), 174 "Denials of discretionary
relief," which sets out instances where judicial review is unavailable. The
provision states, in relevant part,
Notwithstanding any other provision of law (statutory or
nonstatutory), including section 2241 of title 28, or any other habeas
corpus provision, and sections 1361 and 1651 of such title,... and

regardless of whether the judgment, decision, or action is made in
removalproceedings,no court shall have jurisdiction to review-

(i) any judgment regarding the granting of relief under... section
1255 ....

or

169. INS v. Bagamasbad, 429 U.S. 24, 25 n.* (1976) (emphasis omitted).
170. See supra notes 34-35 and accompanying text.

171. See supra notes 40-53 and accompanying text. Section 1255(a) reads, in relevant
part, "The status of an alien... may be adjusted by the Attorney General, in his discretion
and under such regulations as he may prescribe, to that of an alien lawfully admitted for
permanent residence .. " 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a) (2000).
172. Compare infra Part II.A. 1, with infra Part II.B. 1-2.
173. 8 U.S.C. § 1252 (2000 & Supp. V 2005).
174. Seipp, supra note 151, at 2.
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(ii) any other decision or action of the Attorney General or the
Secretary of Homeland Security the authority for which is specified under
of the Attorney General or the
this subchapter to be in the discretion
75
Secretaryof Homeland Security .... 1

Congress added this jurisdiction-stripping provision in 1996 to replace an
affirmative grant of jurisdiction under a previous statute and to forbid
federal courts' jurisdiction to review certain USCIS decisions.' 76 The
REAL ID Act of 2005 added the italicized language, 17 7 which extended the
statute beyond the removal context, resolving a disagreement among the
circuit courts about whether § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) applied only in removal
78

cases. 1

Disagreement continues, nonetheless. In the AOS cases at issue, judges
agree that the jurisdiction-stripping language in subsection (i) precludes
judicial review of the actual discretionary decision whether to adjust an
applicant's status, but they dispute which other aspects of the AOS process
subsection (ii) encompasses, specifically the pace at which the process
proceeds and what actions during the process USCIS must take. 179 Part II
explores these different interpretations in depth, but "longstanding
principles of statutory construction"' 80 provide that there is generally1 81a
"strong presumption in favor of judicial review of administrative action,"
182
and of interpreting statutes to allow judicial review of agency action,
even if Congress did not specifically provide for it. 183 Ambiguities are
84
usually resolved in favor of aliens. 1

175. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B) (emphasis added); see infra note 177 and accompanying
text. Asylum and naturalization decisions are not included in the bar on jurisdiction. See 8
U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii). The "subchapter" specified refers to id. §§ 1151-1378. Section
1361 refers to the mandamus statute and § 1651 refers to the All Writs Act.
176. Houle v. Riding, No. CV-F-07-1266-LJO-GSA, 2008 WL 223670, at *2 (E.D. Cal.
Jan. 28, 2008).
177. REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13, §§ 101(f)(2), 106(a)(l)(ii), 106(b), 119
Stat. 231, 305,310-11 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)).
178. Mary Kenney, Am. Immigration Law Found., Federal Court Jurisdiction over
Discretionary Decisions After REAL ID: Mandamus, Other Affirmative Suits and Petitions
for Review 3 (2006), available at http://www.ailf.org/lac/realid update_040506.pdf; see also
ANA Int'l, Inc. v. Way, 393 F.3d 886, 891 n.3 (9th Cir. 2004) (finding that "[t]he Sixth,
Tenth, and Seventh Circuits have held that [it] does apply outside the context of removal
decisions," while "[s]everal district courts ... have held that [it] applies only to decisions
made in the course of removal proceedings" (citations omitted)).
179. Safadi v. Howard, 466 F. Supp. 2d 696, 698-99 (E.D. Va. 2006).
180. Iddir v. INS, 301 F.3d 492, 496 (7th Cir. 2002).
181. INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 298 (2001).
182. Yu v. Brown, 36 F. Supp. 2d 922, 933-34 (D.N.M. 1999) (citing McNary v. Haitian
Refugee Ctr., Inc., 498 U.S. 479 (1991)).
183. See, e.g., Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 140 (1967) ("[Jludicial review
of... agency action.., will not be cut off unless there is persuasive reason to believe that
such was the purpose of Congress.").
184. Iddir, 301 F.3d at 497.
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c. Regulations at Issue and Other Relevant Statutory Provisions
85
Several regulations related to AOS are relevant to the courts' analyses.1
The directives and procedures they contain influence the courts'
perspectives on the litigants' rights and inform their interpretations of §
1255(a) and § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii). Section 103.2(b)(18), for example, details
the procedure for immigration officials to use if and when they need to

withhold an application. 186 Section 245.6 commands that certain AOS
applicants "shall be interviewed by an immigration officer," although it
provides for the interview to be waived in certain circumstances, including
"when it is determined by the Service that an interview is unnecessary." 187
Several provisions set out the steps to be taken following decisions on
applications, directing the agency to notify applicants of the outcomes and
88
record those granted LPR status. 1

185. INA regulations are all contained in title 8 of the Code of Federal Regulations.
186. 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(b)(18) (2007).
The full text of the regulation, entitled
"Withholding adjudication" reads,
A district director may authorize withholding adjudication of a visa petition or
other application if the district director determines that an investigation has been
undertaken involving a matter relating to eligibility or the exercise of discretion,
where applicable, in connection with the application or petition, and that the
disclosure of information to the applicant or petitioner in connection with the
adjudication of the application or petition would prejudice the ongoing
investigation. If an investigation has been undertaken and has not been completed
within one year of its inception, the district director shall review the matter and
determine whether adjudication of the petition or application should be held in
abeyance for six months or until the investigation is completed, whichever comes
sooner.
If, after six months of the district director's determination, the
investigation has not been completed, the matter shall be reviewed again by the
district director and, if he/she concludes that more time is needed to complete the
investigation, adjudication may be held in abeyance for up to another six months.
If the investigation is not completed at the end of that time, the matter shall be
referred to the regional commissioner, who may authorize that adjudication be held
in abeyance for another six months. Thereafter, if the Associate Commissioner,
Examinations, with the concurrence of the Associate Commissioner, Enforcement,
determines it is necessary to continue to withhold adjudication pending completion
of the investigation, he/she shall review that determination every six months.
187. Id. § 245.6.
188. Id. § 245.2(a)(5). The text of the regulation reads, in relevant part,
(i) General. The applicant shall be notified of the decision of the director and, if
the application is denied, the reasons for the denial. (ii) Under section 245 of the
Act. If the application is approved, the applicant's permanent residence shall be
recorded as of the date of the order approving the adjustment of status. An
application for adjustment of status, as a preference alien, shall not be approved
until an immigrant visa number has been allocated by the Department of State ....
No appeal lies from the denial of an application by the director, but the applicant,
if not an arriving alien, retains the right to renew his or her application in
proceedings under 8 CFR part 240.... (iii) Under the Act of November 2, 1966. if
the application is approved, the applicant's permanent residence shall be recorded
in accordance with the provisions of section 1.
Id.; see also id. § 209.2(f) (containing same directives as § 245.2(a)(5) for asylum AOS
applicants).
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Other statutory provisions of the INA influence the opinions discussed in
Part II as well. For example, 8 U.S.C. § 1103, describing the powers and
duties of the highest-ranking immigration officials, dictates that "[t]he
Secretary of Homeland Security shall be charged with the administration
and enforcement of this chapter and all other laws relating to the
immigration and naturalization of aliens."' 189 Section 1571, detailing the
purposes and policy of the subchapter, avers, "It is the sense of Congress
that the processing of an immigration benefit application should be
completed not later than 180 days after the initial filing of the
application ...."190 These INA provisions, together with other statutes and
regulations introduced in this part, are at the heart of the split among federal
courts concerning whether to grant the government's motions to dismiss the
AOS suits. Issues related to the FBI name checks and systemic agency
problems discussed earlier also shape the split. The next part of this Note
examines the opposing conclusions of federal courts.
II. THE DISTRICT

COURTS SPEAK-AND DISAGREE: THE SPLIT OVER

MOTIONS TO DISMISS THE APPLICANTS' CASES'

91

District courts do not agree on whether to dismiss AOS applicants'
injunctive suits claiming that USCIS violated a duty to adjudicate
applications within a reasonable time. This part examines that split of
authority. It refers to the courts granting defendants' motions to dismiss as
"dismissing courts," and those allowing plaintiffs' claims to survive as
"asserting courts." The two approaches depend on the construction and
interpretation of the INA provisions and regulations, in addition to other
public policy considerations introduced in Part I.
A. Courts GrantingDefendants' Motions to Dismiss
This section introduces and discusses the legal arguments for dismissing
AOS lawsuits. The dismissing courts generally take an approach that defers
to "'[t]he power of congress to exclude aliens altogether from the United
189. 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a)(1) (Supp. V 2005).

190. Id. § 1571(b).
191. The courts are split both along and within districts. See Saleem v. Keisler, 520 F.
Supp. 2d 1048, 1053 (W.D. Wis. 2007) (Crabb, J.) (denying motions to dismiss and noting
that her ruling clashes with fellow Western District of Wisconsin Judge John C. Shabaz's
holding in Bugulu v. Gonzalez, 490 F. Supp. 2d 965 (W.D. Wis. 2007)). Compare Tao Luo
v. Keisler, 521 F. Supp. 2d 72, 72 (D.D.C. 2007) (finding no federal court jurisdiction), with
Zaigang Liu v. Novak, 509 F. Supp. 2d 1, 7 (D.D.C. 2007) (allowing federal court
jurisdiction). Courts do not even agree on which is the majority position. Compare Dong
Liu v. Chertoff, No. 07CV0005 BEN (WMC), 2007 WL 1300127, at *5 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 30,
2007) (concluding that courts dismissing for lack of jurisdiction are in the majority), with He
v. Chertoff, No. 07 C 363, 2008 WL 36634, at *3 (N.D. I11.
Jan. 2, 2008) (determining that
courts asserting jurisdiction are a "significant majority"). No appellate court has yet
weighed in conclusively on the issue. Grinbergv. Swacina, 478 F. Supp. 2d 1350 (S.D. Fla.
2007) and Feng Li v. Gonzalez, No. 06-5911 (SRC), 2007 WL 1303000 (D.N.J. May 3,
2007), are both up for appeal in the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Eleventh and Third
Circuits, respectively. MacLean, supra note 8.
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States, or to prescribe the terms and conditions upon which they may come
to this country, and to have its declared policy in that regard enforced
1 92
exclusively through executive officers, without judicial intervention.I'
These courts generally do not find that immigration officials have a duty to
adjudicate AOS applications in a reasonable time and that the jurisdictionstripping provisions in § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) foreclose the possibility of
judicial review. With no duty imposed on USCIS and no power of judicial
review, AOS plaintiffs' APA and mandamus claims necessarily fail, 193 and
these courts grant the defendants' motions to dismiss.
1. U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services Does Not Have a Duty to
Adjudicate Adjustment of Status Applications in a Reasonable Time
Dismissing courts reject plaintiffs' contentions that immigration officials
have a nondiscretionary duty to adjudicate AOS applications in a
reasonable time. 194 This section explores their reasoning on this point.
192. Shen v. Chertoff, 494 F. Supp. 2d 592, 595 (E.D. Mich. 2007) (quoting Kleindienst
v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 766 (1972)); accord Orlov v. Howard, 523 F. Supp. 2d 30, 36
(D.D.C. 2007) ("The Supreme Court has clearly stated that [matters of immigration and
national security] are best decided by the legislative and executive branches of government
and that judicial discretion should be accorded such decisions." (citing INS v. AguirreAguirre, 526 U.S. 415, 425 (1999))); Eldeeb v. Chertoff, No. 8:07-cv-236-T-17EAJ, 2007
WL 2209231, at *11 (M.D. Fla. July 30, 2007).
193. See supra notes 141, 149 and accompanying text; see also supra note 168 and
accompanying text.
194. It is unclear whether dismissing courts think that there is a duty to adjudicate at all.
Some courts say USCIS has complete discretion. See, e.g., Feng Li, 2007 WL 1303000, at
*5; Elzerw v. Mueller, No. 07-00166, 2007 WL 1221195, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 23, 2007);
Safadi v. Howard, 466 F. Supp. 2d 696, 699 (E.D. Va. 2006). In Yanping Qiu v. Chertoff,
however, the court noted that it was "not persuaded by those cases which have held that
immigration officials have a non-discretionary duty to adjudicate 1-485 applications." 486 F.
Supp. 2d 412, 417 (D.N.J. 2007). In fact, on many occasions USCIS conceded that it has a
statutory obligation to adjudicate AOS applications at some point. See Houle v. Riding, No.
CV-F-07-1266-LJO-GSA, 2008 WL 223670, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 28, 2008); Sayyadinejad
v. Chertoff, Civil No. 07cv0631 JAH (LSP), 2007 WL 4410356, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 14,
2007); Gelfer v. Chertoff, No. C 06-06724 WHA, 2007 WL 902382, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Mar.
22, 2007); Singh v. Still, 470 F. Supp. 2d 1064, 1067 (N.D. Cal. 2006). Many dismissing
courts at least seem to imply the same. Some have noted that, at some point, delay becomes
the abandonment of a duty to process an application. Zalmout v. Gonzalez, No. 07-12575,
2007 WL 3121532, at *2, 3 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 24, 2007) (Duggan, J.) (ordering a
representative of USCIS or the FBI to testify at a later hearing regarding the cause and nature
of a four-year delay). Another court reasoned that because federal courts have the authority
to review improper exercises of discretion, indefinite delay would warrant judicial
intervention since 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a) requires USCIS to adjudicate the AOS application.
See, e.g., Wei Tan v. Gonzales, No. 07-cv-00133-MEH-MJW, 2007 WL 1576108, at *3 (D.
Colo. May 30, 2007) (quoting Work v. United States ex rel. Rives, 267 U.S. 175, 177
(1925)). Other courts distinguish between USCIS action and inaction on an application.
Shen, 494 F. Supp. 2d at 597 (Friedman, C.J.) ("This is not a case where Defendants have
taken no action or have refused to act on Plaintiffs application."). Generally, these courts
will not intervene as long as USCIS is making some reasonable efforts toward concluding a
plaintiffs application. See Li v. Chertoff, 482 F. Supp. 2d 1172, 1177-78 (S.D. Cal. 2007).
For instance, in Elzerw, the court distinguished certain other cases that had asserted
jurisdiction because "no action at all had been taken" on the plaintiffs' applications. 2007
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a. Section 1255(a) Leaves the Whole Adjustment of Status Process to
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services Discretion

Dismissing courts find that the grant of discretion in § 1255(a) gives
USCIS discretion over all matters related to the AOS process, including the
speed of its decisions. 19 5 Part of the reason they reach this conclusion is by
contrasting § 1255(a)'s discretionary language with other INA provisions,
such as 8 U.S.C. § 1153(c), "which 'repeatedly commands the Attorney
General, in nondiscretionary language, to do a variety of tasks. ' '"19 6 By
comparison, the only limitations imposed on USCIS discretion in § 1255(a)
are statutorily defined eligibility prerequisites, none of which mention the
pace of adjudication, indicating "that Congress considered the decision to
withhold adjudication to be within the discretion granted to [USCIS] in §
197
1255(a)."'

Dismissing courts cite the lack of timelines and judicial review
provisions in § 1255(a) as additional evidence that Congress meant to
impose no AOS processing duties on USCIS.198 When Congress wants to
create timelines and provide for judicial review, it does so, as it has
elsewhere in the INA and in other statutes governing application
procedures. 199 For example, one INA provision gives the government 120
days after a statutorily required applicant examination to grant or deny a
naturalization application, and it specifically provides that after that time
200
"the applicant may ask a U.S. district court to adjudicate the application."
In a statutory provision outside the INA pertaining to applications for
licenses to manufacture or deal in firearms, Congress directs the attorney
general to approve or deny an application for a license within sixty days of
receiving the application, and that after that time applicants are expressly
entitled to file a writ of mandamus to compel the attorney general's
action. 20 1 Clearly, dismissing courts conclude, when Congress wants to
WL 1221195, at *3. In one case of "inaction" the Elzerw court cited, id., however, the
applicant's security check had been initiated, an expedited processing request had been filed,
and the name check had been processed, raising issues that "requir[ed] further inquiry,"
Singh, 470 F. Supp. 2d at 1065; see also infra notes 215-26 and accompanying text.
195. See, e.g., Zhang v. Sec'y of Homeland Sec., No. 1:07CV224, 2007 WL 2572179, at
*4 (N.D. Ohio Aug. 31, 2007); Shen, 494 F. Supp. 2d at 595-96; Yanping Qiu, 486 F. Supp.
2d at 417-20; Li, 482 F. Supp. 2d at 1178; Grinberg,478 F. Supp. 2d at 1352; Safadi, 466 F.
Supp. 2d at 699; see also text accompanying supra note 171.
196. He v. Chertoff, No. 07 C 363, 2008 WL 36634, at *2 (N.D. II1. Jan. 2, 2008)
(quoting Iddir v. INS, 301 F.3d 492, 499-500 (7th Cir. 2002)). As an example of the
repeated commands the He court identifies, 8 U.S.C. § 1153(c)(1)(A)-(D) (2000), regarding
allocation of diversity immigrant visas, directs the attorney general to perform various tasks,
using the word "shall" six times. See id.
197. Yanping Qiu, 486 F. Supp. 2d at 419-20; Feng Li, 2007 WL 1303000, at *6.
198. See, e.g., Shen, 494 F. Supp. 2d at 595-96; Elzerw, 2007 W 1221195, at *2; Safadi,
466 F. Supp. 2d at 699.
199. Grinberg,478 F. Supp. 2d at 1352; Yanping Qiu, 486 F. Supp. 2d at 417-18.
200. Waiji v. Gonzales, 500 F.3d 432, 433 (5th Cir. 2007) (citing 8. U.S.C. § 1447(b));
accord Yanping Qiu, 486 F. Supp. 2d at 417 n.5.
201. Yanping Qiu, 486 F. Supp. 2d at 417 n.5 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 923(d)(2) (2006)).
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confer nondiscretionary duties on executive officers, it knows how to do
so-but it did not in § 1255(a), which
indicates its intention to leave the
20 2
entire process to USCIS discretion.
b. Immigration and Nationality Act Regulations Support Complete
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services Discretion
over the Adjustment of Status Process
Dismissing courts also cite the NA's implementing regulations as
support for their no-duty theory. 20 3 For instance, the regulation giving
immigration officers the authority to withhold adjudication pending the
investigation of an application 20 4 "clearly contemplate[s] that certain
applications may require lengthy investigations," 20 5 and explicitly gives
officials unreviewable discretion to withhold adjudication of applications
while investigations are ongoing. 20 6 While the regulation demands periodic
20 7
review of withheld applications, it never decrees a time for adjudication.
Consequently, judges ought to "defer to [USCIS's] decision to withhold
adjudication pursuant to a regulation that [it] was entitled to promulgate" by
20 8
the discretion § 1255(a) grants.
The dismissing courts also find that the regulations the asserting courts
cite as evidence of a duty are weak. To the dismissing courts, the asserting
20 9
courts impute too much to regulations like § 209.2(f) and § 245.2(a)(5).
The phrases they contain-"shall be notified" and "shall record"-are not
the same as "shall adjudicate." 2 10 Section 209.2(f) "refers to Defendants'
duties after a decision has been reached, while § 103.2(b)(18) grants
211
discretion to withhold adjudication while an application is pending."
Section 209.2(f), therefore, does not limit USCIS's power to withhold
202. Id. at 418.
203. Orlov v. Howard, 523 F. Supp. 2d 30, 34-35 (D.D.C. 2007) (stating that the
applicable regulations indicate Congress's clear intent to leave the pace of processing AOS
applications within agency discretion); Yanping Qiu, 486 F. Supp. 2d at 418-19; Safadi, 466
F. Supp. 2d at 698-99; Alomari v. Reno, No. 97 Civ. 6837(DAB), 1997 WL 724815, at *2
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 19, 1997); cf supra notes 162-65 and accompanying text.
204. 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(b)(18) (2007).
205. Yanping Qiu, 486 F. Supp. 2d at 419; see also Emamian v. Dep't of Homeland Sec.,
No. SA-06-CA-0789-RF, 2007 WL 3047213, at *1 (W.D. Tex. Oct. 11, 2007) (looking to 8
U.S.C. § 1154(b) (2000), which provides when petitions shall not be approved, and 8 C.F.R.

§ 103.2(b)(18), the withholding regulation, to conclude that immigration officials have
discretion to withhold adjudication).
206. Chehab v. Chertoff, No. 07-11068, 2007 WL 2372356, at *1 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 17,
2007); Yanping Qiu, 486 F. Supp. 2d at 418-19.
207. 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(b)(18); see also supra note 186 and accompanying text.
208. Yanping Qiu, 486 F. Supp. 2d at 419 (citing Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res.
Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984)). Section 1255(a) authorizes the attorney

general
text) to
he may
209.

(and now the secretary of Homeland Security, see supra note 35 and accompanying
exercise his discretion with respect to AOS applications "under such regulations as
prescribe." 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a).
For the text of these regulations, see supra note 188.

210. Yanping Qiu, 486 F. Supp. 2d at 418.
211. Id. at419.
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adjudication.2 12 Likewise, the regulation directing that applicants "shall be
interviewed" allows the interview to be waived "when it is determined by
[USCIS] that an interview is unnecessary. '2 13 Far from supporting a duty
theory, the regulations actually support defendants' authority to exercise
discretion throughout the application process.
2. ,No Judicial Review for You: The Preclusionary Language in
§ 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) Encompasses the Pace of Adjudication
Many judges also grant the government's motions to dismiss based on 8
U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii), holding that the provision precludes judicial
review of all discretionary decisions and actions related to the AOS process,
including the pace at which the process proceeds. 2 14 Most dismissing
courts concur with the interpretation of § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) set out in Safadi
v. Howard.2 15 In Safadi, Judge Thomas Selby Ellis stated that §
1252(a)(2)(B) "is refreshingly free from ambiguity and its terms are
pellucidly clear."'2 16 Subsection (i) excludes any judgment granting or
denying AOS from judicial review, while subsection (ii) excludes from
review "any other [discretionary] decision or action specified to be within
USCIS's discretion." 2 17 The process leading up to a decision on an AOS
application clearly falls within subsection (ii)'s scope, since § 1255(a)
"specifically provides that USCIS has the discretion to adjust an alien's
status, under such regulations as it may prescribe. ' '2 18 The question for the
court, then, is whether the pace of processing is within the purview of the
2
term "action" in subsection (ii). 19
To determine the meaning of "action" in Safadi, Judge Ellis looked to
Black's Law Dictionary, where it was defined as "an act or series of
acts." 220 He reasoned that this definition "encompasses the entire process
of reviewing an adjustment application, including the completion of
background and security checks and the pace at which the process

212. Id.
213. Id. at 418 (quoting 8 C.F.R. §§ 245.6, 1245.6 (2006)).
214. See, e.g., Shen v. Chertoff, 494 F. Supp. 2d 592, 595-99 (E.D. Mich. 2007); Bugulu
v. Gonzalez, 490 F. Supp. 2d 965, 967 (W.D. Wis. 2007); Dmitrenko v. Chertoff, No.
1:07cv82 (JCC), 2007 WL 1303009, at *1 (E.D. Va. Apr. 30, 2007).
215. 466 F. Supp. 2d 696 (E.D. Va. 2006); see, e.g., Korobkova v. Jenifer, Civil Case No.
07-11335, 2007 WL 3245178, at *3-4 (E.D. Mich. Nov. 2, 2007); Wang v. Chertoff, No.
1:07-cv-00948-WSD, 2007 WL 4139475, at *4, 6 (N.D. Ga. Oct. 30, 2007); Eldeeb v.
Chertoff, No. 8:07-cv-236-T-17EAJ, 2007 WL 2209231, at *11, 13, 23 (M.D. Fla. July 30,
2007); Sharif v. Chertoff, 497 F. Supp. 2d 928, 932-33 (N.D. Ill. 2007); Zhang v. Chertoff,
491 F. Supp. 2d 590, 592 (W.D. Va. 2007); Bugulu, 490 F. Supp. 2d at 967; Grinberg v.
Swacina, 478 F. Supp. 2d 1350, 1353-54 (S.D. Fla. 2007).
For the text of §

1252(a)(2)(B)(ii), see supra note 175 and accompanying text.
216. Safadi, 466 F. Supp. 2d at 698.
217. Id. (emphasis omitted).
218. Id.
219. Id.; accord Grinberg,478 F. Supp. 2d at 1353.
220. Safadi, 466 F. Supp. 2d at 699 (citation omitted).
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proceeds." 22 1 Any other interpretation would "impermissibly render the
word 'action' superfluous.

'222

In enacting subsection (ii), he continued,

Congress could not have intended to preclude judicial review of all
discretionary actions in the AOS process except for the pace of application
processing. 22 3 Such an interpretation would ignore the absence of timelines
for AOS processing in the INA, permitting judicial review where it was
clearly not intended. 224 In sum, he concluded, "Because the pace of
processing an adjustment application comprises a part of USCIS's 'action,'
and because USCIS has discretion over such actions, there is no jurisdiction
'225
over plaintiff s complaint.
3. No Dice: The Administrative Procedure Act and
Mandamus and Venue Act Cannot Supply Subject Matter Jurisdiction
Another reason these courts dismiss AOS litigants' suits is that given the
INA's grant of discretion in § 1255(a) and its jurisdiction-stripping
provision in § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii), neither the APA nor the MVA could
supply or restore subject matter jurisdiction. One reason the APA is
unavailable to AOS litigants is that their APA claims cannot go forward
unless they "'assert[] that an agency failed to take a discrete agency action
that it is required to take.' ' 226 As the U.S. Supreme Court noted, "'[A]
2 27
delay cannot be unreasonable with respect to action that is not required."'

221. Id.
222. Id. at 700; accord Grinberg, 478 F. Supp. 2d at 1354 (quoting Safadi, 466 F. Supp.
2d at 700).
223. Safadi, 466 F. Supp. 2d at 700.
224. See id.; see also supra notes 198-202 and accompanying text.
225. Safadi, 466 F. Supp. 2d at 701. The Safadi court hedged with respect to the
plaintiffs four-year delay, stating, "Importantly, not addressed here is the question whether
jurisdiction would exist in a district court to review plaintiff's case where USCIS refused
altogether to process an adjustment application or where the delay was so unreasonable as to
be tantamount to a refusal to process the application." Id. at 700; cf Dong Liu v. Chertoff,
No. 07CV0005 BEN (WMC), 2007 WL 1300127, at *5 n.2 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 30, 2007) ("The
Court makes no determination whether a district court could ever have mandamus
jurisdiction under § 1361 to hear a petition to compel USCIS to adjudicate an 1-485
application."). Akram Safadi's was "clear[ly]" not such a case, the court held, because
"issues remain[ed] requiring further inquiry." Safadi, 466 F. Supp. 2d at 697. But see Singh
v. Still, 470 F. Supp. 2d 1064, 1065, 1072 (N.D. Cal. 2006) (asserting jurisdiction under both
mandamus and APA statutes even though the incomplete name check response "raises issues
requiring further inquiry"); see also supra note 194 and accompanying text.
226. Dong Liu, 2007 WL 1300127, at *6 (quoting Norton v. S. Utah Wilderness Alliance,
542 U.S. 55, 64 (2004)). At least one court has held that the APA does not apply at all to
delays in immigration proceedings because the decision whether to adjust status is governed
by the INA. Wei Tan v. Gonzales, No. 07-cv-00133-MEH-MJW, 2007 WL 1576108, at *2
(D. Colo. May 30, 2007) ("We emphasize that our review is conducted under the INA and
not under the [APA]. Unlike the INA, the APA includes a judicially enforceable duty to
proceed within a reasonable time." (quoting Kowalczyk v. INS, 245 F.3d 1143, 1149 n.5
(10th Cir. 2003))).
227. DongLiu, 2007 WL 1300127, at *6 (quoting Norton, 542 U.S. at 63 n.l).
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allegations of unreasonable
Because the AOS process is discretionary,
228
delay cannot be grounds for relief.
APA claims also fail because both preclusionary provisions of § 701(a)
apply. 229 The first preclusionary provision prohibits APA claims when the
relevant statute precludes judicial review, and § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii), they
hold, is just such a statute. 230 The other preclusionary provision, forbidding
plaintiffs from compelling agency actions committed to agency discretion,
also bars jurisdiction in these cases. 2 31 Section 1255(a) clearly gives
USCIS complete discretion over actions taken in the course of the AOS
process. 232 Moreover, the APA's definition of "action" includes a "failure
to act,"'233 so a lack of action on a plaintiffs application is still within the
agency's discretion and captured by the APA's preclusionary provisions.
Furthermore, § 701(a)(2) applies when a statute does not provide a
meaningful standard with which to judge agency actions. 234 The INA
contains no timeline for the speed of AOS processing; instead, it grants the
agency complete discretion over the matter. Agency action can never be
"unreasonably withheld," as the APA requires, and a claim can never be
"clear and certain," as the mandamus statute requires, because the INA
judging the agency's exercise of discretion with
contains no standard for
235
respect to AOS claims.
Likewise, these courts hold that defendants cannot state claims under the
The mandamus statute only applies to plainly
mandamus statute.
actions. 2 36 The discretionary nature of AOS
nondiscretionary
prescribed,
pacing is fatal to these mandamus actions. 2 37 Nor can plaintiffs' claims
as mandamus requires, since no time frame
ever be "clear and certain," 238
limits the action they request.
228. See id.

229. Orlov v. Howard, 523 F. Supp. 2d 30, 36-37 (D.D.C. 2007); Safadi, 466 F. Supp. 2d
at 700; see supra notes 157-65 and accompanying text.

230. Grinberg v. Swacina, 478 F. Supp. 2d 1350, 1355 (S.D. Fla. 2007) (citing 5 U.S.C. §
701(a) (2006)); see supra Part II.A.2.
231. Shen v. Chertoff, 494 F. Supp. 2d 592, 596-97 (E.D. Mich. 2007).
232. See supra Part II.A.1; see also supra notes 147-48 and accompanying text.
233. See Qiu v. Chertoff, 486 F. Supp. 2d 412, 421 n.1 1 (D.N.J. 2007).

234. Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 830 (1985); see also supra notes 162-65 and
accompanying text.
235. See Safadi v. Howard, 466 F. Supp. 2d 696, 699-700 (E.D. Va. 2006).
236. See supra note 141 and accompanying text.
237. See Elzerw v. Mueller, No. 07-00166, 2007 WL 1221195, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 23,
2007); Safadi, 466 F. Supp. 2d at 700; see also Saleh v. Ridge, 367 F. Supp. 2d 508, 511
(S.D.N.Y. 2005) ("Adjustment of immigration status... is a discretionary act, and therefore,
'[in keeping with the plain language [of 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a)], courts have consistently found
mandamus inappropriate in actions based on the government's failure to adjust an
applicant's status."' (second and third alterations in original) (quoting Vladagina v. Ashcroft,
No. 00 Civ. 9456(DAB), 2002 WL 1162426, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 8, 2002))).
238. See, e.g., Dong Liu v. Chertoff, No. 07CV0005 BEN (WMC), 2007 WL 1300127, at
*3, 6 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 30, 2007) ("Plaintiffs have failed to identify any statute or regulation
requiring the FBI and/or USCIS to complete their name checks in any period of time,
reasonable or not. Therefore, the Court declines Plaintiffs' invitation to judicially impose
new heightened requirements."); see also Yan v. Mueller, No. H-07-0313, 2007 WL
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4. Our Hands Are Tied: Public Policy Supports Dismissal

Courts granting motions to dismiss have numerous policy reasons for
their decisions. The possibility of overwhelming agency resources, which
judges historically have factored into decisions regarding agency actions,

often arises as a concern, 239 and it is likely to become an increasingly
prevalent reason not to assert jurisdiction given the new processing backlog

USCIS will have to address. 240 In Yanping Qiu v. Chertoff, Judge Stanley

Chesler worried that creating a duty to act on AOS applications "'would
have the potential for mischievous interference with the functioning of
already overburdened administrative agencies.'

have the authority to review the ultimate
agency already backlogged-Judge Chesler
compel adjudication would do nothing more
line those [AOS] applicants canny enough
district court.

' 242

' 24 1

Since his court did not

AOS outcome-and with the
felt that "granting the writ to
than shuffle to the front of the
to file a complaint in federal

In Orlov v. Howard, Judge John Bates agreed and

thought that granting relief
"would set a dangerous precedent, sending a clear signal that more
litigious applicants are more likely to be moved to the top of the
proverbial pile over other applicants that have waited even longer. Such a
situation hardly optimizes
resources, and serves only the individual at the
243
detriment to the group."

These dismissing courts frequently cite post-9/1 1 concerns as a major
reason not to intervene where the delay is centered on an unresolved name
check. 244 They are loath to meddle where it could compromise or obstruct
investigations crucial to national security. 24 5 There is no need to determine

jurisdiction at all, one court held, when an application is legitimately
delayed by the agency taking the time to resolve security concerns. 24 6 In
Safadi, Judge Ellis echoed this concern, remarking that "in this post-9/1 1

world USCIS must carefully and thoroughly investigate adjustment
1521732, at *6 (S.D. Tex. May 24, 2007) (finding no mandamus jurisdiction because no
time limit had been set on the FBI's completion of background checks); cf Omar v. Mueller,
501 F. Supp. 2d 636, 639 (D.N.J. 2007) (explaining that the court lacked jurisdiction to
compel a naturalization application because there was no requirement that immigration
officials complete an examination in a defined time period).
239. See Wan Shih Hsieh v. Kiley, 569 F.2d 1179, 1182 (2d Cir. 1978).
240. See supra notes 104-12 and accompanying text.
241. Yanping Qiu v. Chertoff, 486 F. Supp. 2d 412, 420 (D.N.J. 2007) (quoting Zheng v.
Reno, 166 F. Supp. 2d 875, 879-80 (S.D.N.Y. 2001)).
242. Id. (citing Liberty Fund, Inc. v. Chao, 394 F. Supp. 2d 105, 116 (D.D.C. 2005)).
243. Orlov v. Howard, 523 F. Supp. 2d 30, 36 (D.D.C. 2007) (quoting Dmitrenko v.
Chertoff, No. 1:07cv82 (JCC), 2007 WL 1303009, at *1 (E.D. Va. Apr. 30, 2007)).
244. See, e.g., Orlov, 523 F. Supp. 2d at 36, 38; Zhang v. Sec'y of Homeland Sec., No.
1:07CV224, 2007 WL 2572179, at *6 (N.D. Ohio Aug. 31, 2007); Dong Liu v. Chertoff, No.
07CV0005 BEN (WMC), 2007 WL 1300127, at *5 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 30, 2007); Safadi v.
Howard, 466 F. Supp. 2d 696, 700 (E.D. Va. 2006).
245. Shen v. Chertoff, 494 F. Supp. 2d 592, 597 (E.D. Mich. 2007).
246. Sayyadinejad v. Chertoff, Civil No. 07cv0631 JAH (LSP), 2007 WL 4410356, at
*5-6 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 14, 2007).
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applications to ensure they are not granted without the appropriate good
cause. Our national security requires that caution and thoroughness in these
'24 7
matters not be sacrificed for the purpose of expediency.
Other concerns also arise. Where a name check is the source of
application delay, some courts feel that holding USCIS responsible for the
248
delay would be unjust, since name checks are the FBI's responsibility.
Others express sympathy for plaintiffs but conclude that the political
branches are the ones best suited to address the issue of delay, 249 since
making "wholesale improvement[s]" of administrative programs is not a
250
judicial function.
Part II.A of this Note has detailed the statutory interpretations underlying
some district courts' decisions to grant the government's motions to dismiss
the AOS cases. These courts and the asserting courts introduced in Part
II.B take opposing views on nearly every relevant issue; the courts even
differ on the way in which the issues are framed. As Part II.A has shown,
the dismissing courts see the important question in these cases as whether
USCIS has discretion over the pace of adjudication. To the asserting
courts, discussed in Part II.B, the main question is whether USCIS has a
duty to adjudicate applications in a reasonable time. The next section
describes the asserting courts' arguments.
B. Courts Asserting Jurisdiction
This section introduces and discusses the legal arguments that district
courts employ in asserting jurisdiction over AOS suits and denying the
government's motions to dismiss. To these courts, USCIS has a duty to
process AOS applications within a reasonable time, and nothing in the1
25
preclusionary language in § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) forecloses judicial review.
The posture of these courts reflects the general idea that the federal
judiciary has an obligation to review cases where "'an agency's
recalcitrance, inertia, laggard pace or inefficiency sorely disadvantages the
2 52
class of beneficiaries Congress intended to protect."'

247. Safadi, 466 F. Supp. 2d, at 701; accord Alkenani v. Barrows, 356 F. Supp. 2d 652,
657 (N.D. Tex. 2005).
248. See, e.g., Wei Tan v. Gonzales, No. 07-cv-00133-MEH-MJW, 2007 WL 1576108, at
*3, 4 n.1 (D. Colo. May 30, 2007) (finding that the FBI was not a party in the suit, but even
if it was the court was "presented with no authority which would allow it to require the FBI

to conduct a security background check more expeditiously, absent a showing of complete
inaction by the FBI"). Courts declining to dismiss are much less receptive to this argument.
See infra notes 328-29 and accompanying text.
249. Maftoum v. Chavez, No. 07-CV-12819, 2007 WL 3203850, at *4 (E.D. Mich. Oct.
31, 2007); Safadi, 466 F. Supp. 2d at 701.
250. Yan v. Mueller, No. H-07-0313, 2007 WL 1521732, at *9 n.9 (S.D. Tex. May 24,
2007) (quoting Norton v. S. Utah Wilderness Alliance, 542 U.S. 55, 64 (2004)).
251. See infra Part II.B.1-3.
252. Yu v. Brown, 36 F. Supp. 2d 922, 929 (D.N.M. 1999) (quoting In re Am. Fed'n of
Gov't Employees, AFL-CIO, 790 F.2d 116, 117 (D.C. Cir. 1986)).
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1. U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services Has a Duty to Process and
Adjudicate Adjustment of Status Applications
To make out a claim under either the APA or the mandamus statute, the
defendant must owe the plaintiff a nondiscretionary duty. 2 53 Thus, courts
asserting jurisdiction necessarily make a preliminary inquiry into whether
immigration officials have a duty to adjudicate AOS applications, which
this section addresses, and whether they must act on that duty in a
reasonable time, which Part II.B.2 addresses below.
a. Section 1255(a) Supports a Duty to Adjudicate
Adjustment of Status Applications
It is undisputed that the decision whether to grant or deny an AOS is a
matter of agency discretion. 254 Asserting courts, however, draw a
distinction between USCIS's "discretion over how to resolve an application
and... discretion over whether it resolves an application." 255 The latter,
they hold, is a nondiscretionary duty owed to those whose AOS
applications are properly before USCIS. 2 56 Congress enacted § 1255(a) to
statutorily authorize noncitizens to seek AOS. 257
Deciding those
applications, then, is a congressionally assigned task that USCIS cannot
refuse or neglect to perform. 258 The lack of a time frame in § 1255(a) does
not alter the nondiscretionary nature of USCIS's duty. "Congress imposes
many duties on executive agencies without prescribing specific time frames
for their completion." 259 In other areas of immigration, the U.S. Court of
253. See supra notes 141, 149-50 and accompanying text.
254. See, e.g., Reply to Defendants' Opposition at 4, Xin Liu v. Chertoff, No. CV S 062808 RRB EFB, 2007 WL 2973375 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 15, 2007) ("Plaintiffs are not attempting
to... challeng[e] how the agency is adjudicating applications."); see also Razaq v. Poulos,
No. C 06-2461 WDB, 2007 WL 61884, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 8, 2007) ("[T]he substance of
the decision to grant or deny a petition obviously is discretionary."); supra note 143; supra
note 179 and accompanying text.
255. Singh v. Still, 470 F. Supp. 2d 1064, 1067 (N.D. Cal. 2006) (citation omitted);
accord Soneji v. Dep't of Homeland Sec., 525 F. Supp. 2d 1151, 1155 (N.D. Cal. 2007);
Landry v. Chertoff, No. 07-0506, 2007 WL 2007996, at *3 (E.D. La. July 5, 2007).
256. Singh, 470 F. Supp. 2d at 1067; Fu v. Reno, No. CIV.A. 3:99-CV-0981, 2000 WL
1644490, at *5 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 1, 2000); accord Shah v. Hansen, No. 1:07 CV 1576, 2007
WL 3232353, at *4 (N.D. Ohio Oct. 31, 2007); Yong Tang v. Chertoff, 493 F. Supp. 2d 148,
155 (D. Mass. 2007) ("A grant of adjustment of status is not 'legally required,' but
adjudication of the application one way or the other certainly is."); Duan v. Zamberry, No.
06-1351, 2007 WL 626116, at *3 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 23, 2007).
257. Saleem v. Keisler, 520 F. Supp. 2d 1048, 1054 (W.D. Wis. 2007); see also supra
note 169 and accompanying text.
258. Belegradek v. Gonzales, 523 F. Supp. 2d 1364, 1367 (N.D. Ga. 2007) ("Moreover,
the Eleventh Circuit has held that the eligibility standards contained in 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a)
limit the Attorney General's discretion to categorically deny certain classes of individuals
consideration for a status change, further suggesting the non-discretionary nature of the
Attorney General's duty to adjudicate." (citing Scheerer v. U.S. Att'y Gen., 445 F.3d 1311,
1322 (11 th Cir. 2006))).
259. Saleem, 520 F. Supp. 2d 1048, 1053 (noting that courts dismissing the AOS cases
have not cited other situations where the failure to impose a deadline amounted to a
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Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has inferred a nondiscretionary duty to
260
adjudicate applications without express statutory commands to do so.
b. The Applicable Regulations Support a Duty to Adjudicate
Asserting courts also cite applicable INA regulations as evidence that a
duty to process AOS applications exists. 26 1 The phrasing of the regulations
assumes each application will be decided. 262 For example, one regulation
for asylum-based applications directs that applicants "shall be notified of
'2 63
the decision" and that "the director shall record the alien's admission.
Decisions on marriage-based applications contain a similar directive: "The
applicant shall be notified of the decision," and the "permanent residence
264
shall be recorded."
The regulation set out for "Withholding adjudication" supports the duty
as well. 265 In Dong v. Chertoff, Judge Saundra Armstrong noted that the
regulation ensures some timely decision on AOS applications by setting
forth detailed procedural requirements for lawfully withholding
adjudication, permitting adjudication to be withheld for specific time
intervals. 266 The section does not, as dismissing courts suggest, give
USCIS "blanket authority" to withhold an application indefinitely. 2 67 If
USCIS wishes to withhold adjudication, Judge Armstrong concluded that it
268
must do so in compliance with this regulation.

withdrawal of jurisdiction); Razaq, 2007 WL 61884, at *4 (compelling action on an
"immediate relative" determination, not AOS).
260. Saleem, 520 F. Supp. 2d at 1054 (citing Iddir v. INS, 301 F.3d 492, 499-500 (7th
Cir. 2002)).
261. See, e.g., id.; Singh v. Still, 470 F. Supp. 2d 1064, 1067 (N.D. Cal. 2006)
("Regulations support there being such a duty .... ").
262. Shah, 2007 WL 3232353, at *5; Saleem, 520 F. Supp. 2d at 1054.
263. 8 C.F.R. § 209.2(f) (2007); see Haidari v. Frazier, Civil No. 06-3215 (DWF/AJB),
2006 WL 3544922, at *4 (D. Minn. Dec. 8, 2006); Aboushaban v. Mueller, No. C 06-1280
BZ, 2006 WL 3041086, at *1-2 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 24, 2006); Singh, 470 F. Supp. 2d at 1067
n.6; see also supra note 188 and accompanying text. But see supra notes 211-12 and
accompanying text.
264. 8 C.F.R. § 245.2(a)(5)(i)-(ii); Fonov v. Gonzales, No. C-3-07-207, 2007 WL
2815451, at *4 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 25, 2007) (holding that the plaintiff could not meet the
second element of a mandamus claim); Singh, 470 F. Supp. 2d at 1067 n.6; see also supra
note 188 and accompanying text.
265. Dong v. Chertoff, 513 F. Supp. 2d 1158, 1166 (N.D. Cal. 2007) ("Thus, the source
of the defendants' non-discretionary duty to 'act' upon the plaintiffs' application is
specifically traced to 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(b)(18)."); see supra note 186 and accompanying text.
266. Dong, 513 F. Supp. 2d at 1166-68.
267. Id. at 1168; see also Al-Juburi v. Chertoff, No. 3:06-CV-1270-D, 2007 WL
2285964, at *6 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 9, 2007); Elmalky v. Upchurch, No. 3:06-CV-2359-B, 2007
WL 944330, at *4 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 28, 2007).
268. Dong, 513 F. Supp. 2d at 1167 ("[W]hile the regulation gives authority to withhold
adjudication... , this must be done consistent with the terms of the regulation."); Han Cao
v. Upchurch, 496 F. Supp. 2d 569, 576 (E.D. Pa. 2007) ("In the absence of compliance with
the stated procedure, § 103.2(b)(18) does not give defendants discretion to delay resolution
of plaintiffs' applications.").
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2. Make It Happen: The Duty to Adjudicate an Application
Must Be Fulfilled in a Reasonable Time
The previous section detailed the asserting courts' analysis regarding
whether there is a duty to adjudicate AOS applications. This section
follows the next step in their reasoning-that USCIS not only has a duty to
adjudicate, but also that it must do so within a reasonable time.
a. Tracing the Reasonable Time Mandate to the
Administrative ProcedureAct
One source of USCIS's duty to adjudicate in a reasonable time, asserting
courts find, is the APA itself.269 The duty to adjudicate applications
established in Part II.B.1 is an agency "action" of the sort the APA was
established to regulate. 270 Section 706(1) of the APA clearly sanctions
judicial intervention to compel any agency action unreasonably delayed or
unlawfully withheld. 2 7 1 In Yong Tang v. Chertoff, Judge Nancy Gertner
cited this provision in response to defendants' argument that Congress
meant to restrict judicial review to instances where agencies violated fixed
statutory or regulatory deadlines. 272 If the defendants were correct, she
reasoned, the statute would say "agency action unlawfully withheld or
delayed. '273 Inserting "unreasonably" before the word "delayed," however,
clearly indicates that Congress contemplated judicial review of agency
conduct and determinations of what is "unreasonable" in the pace of AOS
adjudications. 274 She concluded that any other interpretation would render
§ 706(1) and § 555(b) "hortatory," and undermine the very purpose of the
APA.

2 75

Section 555(b) commands that an agency "shall proceed to conclude a
matter presented to it" within a "reasonable time." 2 76 Asserting courts
acknowledge that no bright line exists to determine when delay on AOS
applications becomes unreasonable. 2 77 However, that does not render the
standard meaningless, 278 since "federal courts routinely assess the
269. Saleem v. Keisler, 520 F. Supp. 2d 1048, 1057-58 (W.D. Wis. 2007) ("[T]he APA
itself provides the appropriate standard of review ('unreasonable delay') ....
" (citing Yu v.
Brown,
270.
271.
272.

36 F. Supp. 2d 922, 931-32 (D.N.M. 1999))).
See supra note 147 and accompanying text.
See supra note 146 and accompanying text.
Yong Tang v. Chertoff, 493 F. Supp. 2d 148, 155 (D. Mass. 2007).

273. Id.
274. Id.
275. Id. at 155-56; see also In re Am. Fed'n of Gov't Employees, AFL-CIO, 790 F.2d
116, 117 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (stating that courts must "assure the vitality of the congressional
instruction that agencies conclude matters presented to them 'within a reasonable time"');
see also Saleem, 520 F. Supp. 2d at 1058 ("[A]n interpretation of 'unreasonably delayed' to
mean only 'beyond a statutory deadline' would render the phrase superfluous.").
276. 5 U.S.C. § 555(b) (2000).
277. Belegradek v. Gonzales, 523 F. Supp. 2d 1364, 1368 (N.D. Ga. 2007) (quoting
Linville v. Barrows, 489 F. Supp. 2d 1278, 1282 (W.D. Okla. 2007)).
278. Yong Tang v. Chertoff, 493 F. Supp. 2d 148, 155 (D. Mass. 2007).
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'reasonableness' of the pace of agency action under the APA. '279 It is the
appropriate standard any time Congress "imposes a duty [on an agency] but
does not articulate a specific timeframe within which that duty must be
2 80
honored," despite defendants' arguments to the contrary.
b. Tracing the Reasonable Time Mandate to
Immigration and Nationality Act Provisionsand Agency Policy
Asserting courts argue that § 1255(a), entitling noncitizens to apply to

adjust status, necessarily must be tied to a duty of reasonableness.
Deferring to USCIS on the pace of adjudication would obliterate the
agency's duty to adjudicate and effectively gut the notification requirements
found in the regulations. 28 ' In Saleem v. Keisler, Judge Barbara Crabb
questioned, "If defendants have an obligation to decide applications but
have unfettered discretion to put off deciding an application for as long as
282
they want, how could the duty to decide ever be judicially enforced?"
Never, she answered, which "would strip defendants' duty of any
meaning," 2 83 an outcome Congress could not have intended. 284 In Duan v.
Zamberry, the court elaborated on this idea, stating that "the danger posed
by non-reviewability is the 'unfettered discretion to relegate aliens to a state
2 85
of 'limbo,' leaving them to languish there indefinitely."
At least one court noticed an inherent contradiction in dismissing courts'

reasoning that immigration officials do not have to act in a reasonable time.
In Ping Qiu v. Chertoff Judge Thelton Henderson pointed out that Safadi
and its progeny are
279. Ma v. Gonzales (Ma I), No. C07-122RSL, 2007 WL 1655188, at *5 (W.D. Wash
June 5, 2007) (explaining that, "when an agency is required to act-either by organic statute
or by the APA-within [a] ...reasonable time, § 706 leaves in the courts the discretion to
decide whether agency delay is unreasonable" (alterations in original) (quoting Forest
Guardians v. Babbitt, 174 F.3d 1178, 1190 (10th Cir. 1998))).
280. Razaq v. Poulos, No. C 06-2461 WDB, 2007 WL 61884, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 8,
2007); see Yu v. Brown, 36 F. Supp. 2d 922, 931-32 (D.N.M. 1999) (stating that the APA
imposes the duty to adjudicate applications in a reasonable time); see also Forest Guardians,
174 F.3d at 1190 ("[I]f an agency has no concrete deadline establishing a date by which it
must act, and instead is governed only by general timing provisions-such as [those
contained in 5 U.S.C. § 555(b)]-a court must compel only action that is delayed
unreasonably."); Yong Tang, 493 F. Supp. 2d at 155 (quoting Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S.
821, 830 (1985)); supra notes 154, 158-61 and accompanying text.
281. Yong Tang, 493 F. Supp. 2d at 156; accord Gelfer v. Chertoff, No. C 06-06724
WHA, 2007 WL 902382, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 22, 2007) ("Allowing the respondents a
limitless amount of time to adjudicate petitioners' application . . . could negate the USCIS's
duty under 8 C.F.R. § 245.2(a)(5).").
282. Saleem v. Keisler, 520 F. Supp. 2d 1048, 1055 (W.D. Wis. 2007).
283. Id.; see also Yong Tang, 493 F. Supp. 2d at 150 ("The duty to act is no duty at all if
the deadline is eternity."); Razaq v. Poulos, No. C 06-2461 WDB, 2007 WL 61884, at *3
(N.D. Cal. Jan. 8, 2007) ("A 'duty to decide' becomes no duty at all if it is accompanied by
unchecked power to decide when to decide.").
284. Agbemaple v. INS, No. 97 C 8547, 1998 WL 292441, at *2 (N.D. I11.
May 18,
1998).
285. Duan v. Zamberry, No. 06-1351, 2007 WL 626116, at *4 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 23, 2007)
(quoting Kim v. Ashcroft, 340 F. Supp. 2d 384, 393 (S.D.N.Y. 2004)).
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internally inconsistent in that they conclude that courts do not have
jurisdiction to review the reasonableness of the pace of processing [AOS]
applications as long as the agency "is making reasonable efforts," thereby
implying that a court does have 286some authority to review the
reasonableness of the agency's efforts.
Furthermore, the dismissing courts' rationale that the judiciary "should not
wade into an area without readily applicable statutory standards collides
with these same cases' insistence that district courts can and should grant
'2 87
relief where delay amounts to a refusal to act."
Courts have found the reasonable time duty in other places, too. One
court found that USCIS itself had established a timetable for application
processing. 288 In Ibrahim v. Chertoff,the court noted that, on USCIS's web
site, a May 18, 2007, post stated that the agency was processing
applications received on January 1, 2006.289 The application at issue had
been received on February 11, 2000, which meant that USCIS's
"processing ha[d] been delayed for over six years by the agency's own
standards." 290 Other courts have also looked to the INA's so-called "Sense
of Congress" statute, which sets out goals for expeditiously processing
applications for immigration benefits, such as AOS. 2 9 1 Although the statute
has been called "no more than non-binding, legislative dicta, '292 these
courts have found it persuasive in the context of unreasonably delayed AOS
applications. They reason that, "[a]lthough Congress has not established a
mandatory time frame for the USCIS to complete the adjudication,
Congress sets a normative expectation... of a reasonable processing time
for an immigrant benefit application as no more than 180 days after initial
293
application."
Based on all of the foregoing analysis, asserting courts find that USCIS
not only has a duty to adjudicate AOS applications, but also a duty to do so
in a reasonable time. Having reached this conclusion, they go on to
consider whether the INA's jurisdiction-stripping provisions apply. Their
reasoning for finding that the provisions do not apply is examined next.

286. Ping Qiu v. Chertoff, No. C07-0578 TEH, 2007 WL 1831130, at *2 (N.D. Cal. June
25, 2007) (citing Li v. Chertoff, 482 F. Supp. 2d 1172, 1178 (S.D. Cal. 2007)); see supra
note 194.
287. He v. Chertoff, No. 07 C 363, 2008 WL 36634, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 2, 2008); see
sources cited supra notes 194, 225.
288. Ibrahim v. Chertoff, No. 06cv2071-L (POR), 2007 WL 1558521, at *7 (S.D. Cal.
May 25, 2007).
289. Id.
290. Id.
291. 8 U.S.C. § 1571(b) (2000); see also supra note 190 and accompanying text.
292. Yang v. Cal. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 183 F.3d 953, 961-62 (9th Cir. 1999).
293. Konchitsky v. Chertoff, No. C-07-00294 RMW, 2007 WL 2070325, at *4 (N.D. Cal.
July 13, 2007); accord Ma v. Gonzales (Ma I), No. C07-122RSL, 2007 WL 2743395, at *6
(W.D. Wash. Sept. 17, 2007).
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3. Nothing Strips Away Subject Matter Jurisdiction:
§ 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) Does Not Foreclose Judicial Review
As previous discussion has explained, asserting courts hold that USCIS
has a duty to adjudicate AOS applications in a reasonable time. Before
asserting jurisdiction in these cases, however, asserting courts confront §
1252(a)(2)(B)(ii).
They hold that the statute's jurisdiction-stripping
provisions are not broad enough to encompass the duty to conclude AOS
294
applications in a reasonable time.
a. Delay in Adjustment of Status Application ProcessingIs Not a
Discretionary "Decision or Action" Under § 1252(a) (2) (B)(ii)
By its own terms, § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) applies only to a discretionary
"decision or action" of the attorney general and the Homeland Security
secretary. 295 In Saleem, Judge Crabb used a definition of "action" different
from and less expansive than the Safadi court's.296 Although "action" is
certainly broader than a "decision," she wrote, it also "suggests that some
conclusion has been made about the appropriate course to take. 2 97
Immigration officials' failure to render decisions they are required to make
does not fit that definition and so does not constitute a "decision or action"
within the plain meaning of the statute. 29 8 The Seventh Circuit, for
example, has read the phrase "decision or action" to bar only "actual
discretionary decisions," 299 such as a "denial of relief or decision to defer
[an application]," which are fundamentally different from "complete
inaction and failure to make any decision. '300 The latter, the Seventh
Circuit held, escapes the jurisdiction-stripping language. 3 0 1 Similarly, in
Duan v. Zamberry, Chief Judge Donetta Ambrose held that § 1255(a), the
source of AOS authority,
...specifies

only that it is within the discretion of the Attorney General to

adjust one's status; it does not address, much less specify any discretion
associated with, the pare of application processing. Given the absence of
an explicit provision to that effect, the principles [of narrowly reading the
294. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) (2000 & Supp. V 2005); see supra notes 173-79
and accompanying text.
295. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii).
296. Saleem v. Keisler, 520 F. Supp. 2d 1048, 1051 (W.D. Wis. 2007); cf supra note 220

and accompanying text.
297. Saleem, 520 F. Supp. 2d at 1051; see also Dong v. Chertoff, 513 F. Supp. 2d 1158,

1165-66 (N.D. Cal. 2007) ("The phrase 'decision or action' connotes some affirmative
conduct by the Attorney General.").
298. Saleem, 520 F. Supp. 2d at 1051 ("Because plaintiff's claim is premised on
defendants' refusal to make a 'decision' or to take 'action' on his application, I must
conclude that § 1252(a)(2)(B) is not implicated in this case."); accord Soneji v. Dep't of
Homeland Sec., 525 F. Supp. 2d 1151, 1154 (N.D. Cal. 2007); Zaigang Liu v. Novak, 509 F.

Supp. 2d 1, 6-7 (D.D.C. 2007).
299. Iddir v. INS, 301 F.3d 492, 497 (7th Cir. 2002).
300. Id. (citations omitted).
301. Id. at 498.
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Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA)
and a strong presumption in favor of judicial review of administrative
action] render § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) inapplicable to a claim of adjudicatory
delay. Although the speed of processing may be "discretionary" in the
sense that it is determined by choice, and that it rests on various decisions
that Defendants may be entitled to make, it is not discretionary in302
the
manner required by the jurisdiction-stripping language of the IIRIRA.

Indeed, "no matter how narrowly a court defines 'action,' it would require
an Orwellian twisting of the word to conclude that it means a failure to
' 303
adjudicate. "
These courts have also responded to the dismissing courts' reasoning. In
Duan, for example, Chief Judge Ambrose noticed a contradiction in the
Safadi interpretation of § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii). 30 4 She recalled Safadi's
holding that immigration officials' four-year delay was not tantamount to a
refusal to adjudicate an application, and he wondered "how an unreasonable
delay might not qualify as 'action' under the court's analysis,
while a
30 5
reasonable delay unambiguously does constitute 'action.'
The government has pointed out that § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) forbids review
of any "decision or action," and argued that "agency action" includes the
"failure to act" under the APA definitions. 30 6 The asserting courts reject
this argument, pointing out that § 551(13) specifies that the definition
applies only "[flor the purpose of this subchapter. '30 7 Nothing indicates
that the definition also applies to § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii). 30 8 Furthermore, the
APA, located in title 6, is clearly not "specified in" the subchapters of title 8
30 9
to which § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) applies.
b. "Specified Under This Subchapter" Means
"Specified Under This Subchapter"
Section 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) singles out for preclusion the discretionary acts
"the authority for which is specified under this subchapter," referring to §§
1151 through 1381 of title 8.310 In Belegradek v. Gonzales, the court held
that in order for the government to invoke § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii), it had to rely
on an "explicit, 'Congressionally-defined, discretionary statutory power'
in the specified subchapters of title 8 and "not an administrative or other
implied discretionary power," such as § 103.2(b)(18). 3 11 While § 1255(a)
302.
303.
304.
305.
306.
307.
308.
309.
310.
text.
311.
v. U.S.

Duan v. Zamberry, No. 06-1351, 2007 WL 626116, at *2 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 23, 2007).
Saleem, 520 F. Supp. 2d at 1052.
Duan, 2007 WL 626116, at *3; see supra notes 215-25 and accompanying text.
Duan, 2007 WL 626116, at *3.
5 U.S.C. § 551(13) (2000).
Soneji v. Dep't of Homeland Sec., 525 F. Supp. 2d 1151, 1154 n.2 (N.D. Cal. 2007).
Id.
See infra note 311 and accompanying text.
8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) (Supp. V 2005); see supra note 175 and accompanying
Belegradek v. Gonzales, 523 F. Supp. 2d 1364, 1367 (N.D. Ga. 2007) (quoting Zafar
Att'y Gen., 461 F.3d 1357, 1361 (1 1th Cir. 2006)); accord Saleem v. Keisler, 520 F.
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falls within title 8, the Belegradek court noted that the provision did not
explicitly enumerate inaction on an AOS application as a discretionary act
and therefore escaped preclusion. 3 12 In fact, another court noted that
nothing in the [NA "addresses, much less specifies, any discretion
associated with the pace of adjudication. '3 13 On this point, the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that "[t]he statutory language is
uncharacteristically pellucid . . . ; it does not allude generally to
'discretionary authority' or to 'discretionary authority exercised under this
statute,' but specifically to 'authority for which is specified under this
subchapterto be in the discretion of the Attorney General."' 3 14
c. The Title and Construction of§ 1252 Do Not Support Preclusion
Courts have also examined § 1252's name and construction in
3 15
determining whether it precludes judicial review of the plaintiff s claims.
In Shah v. Hansen, the court reasoned that by its own title, § 1252 applies to
"Judicial review of orders of removal," and subsection 1252(a)(2)(B),
"Denials of discretionary relief," applies only where relief has actually been
denied. 3 16 For AOS litigants, relief has been neither granted nor denied,
and so the statute is inapplicable. 3 17 Even on a broad reading of the statute,
the plaintiffs ask the court "to examine and rectify a gross inaction," not for
review of a decision or action regarding the granting of relief. 3 18
In Saleem, Judge Crabb examined § 1252(a)(2)(B)'s purpose, namely, to
"shield from judicial review judgments regarding the propriety of adjusting

Supp. 2d 1048, 1056 (W.D. Wis. 2007) ("Obviously, because § 103.2(b)(18) is a regulation
and not a statute, any discretion granted by the regulation is not 'specified under this
subchapter' for the purpose of acting as a bar to judicial review." (citing Soltane v. U.S.
Dep't of Justice, 381 F.3d 143, 146 (3d Cir. 2004))).
For a list of the "myriad
Congressionally-defined, discretionary statutory powers" set out in those subchapters, see
Zafar, 461 F.3d at 1361.
312. Belegradek,523 F. Supp. 2d at 1367-68.
313. Ma v. Gonzales (Ma1),No.C07-122RSL, 2007 WL 1655188, at *3 (W.D.Wash.
June 5, 2007).
314. Zhao v. Gonzales, 404 F.3d 295, 303 (5th Cir. 2005) (quoting 8 U.S.C. §
1252(a)(2)(B)(ii)); accord Khan v. Att'y Gen., 448 F.3d 226, 232 (3d Cir. 2006) (quoting
Zhao, 404 F.3d at 303).
315. See, e.g.,
Shah v. Hansen, No. 1:07 CV 1576, 2007 WL 3232353, at *4 (N.D. Ohio
Oct. 31, 2007) (examining the section's titles); Paunescu v. INS, 76 F. Supp. 2d 896, 899900 (N.D. I11.
1999) (same).
316. Shah, 2007 WL 3232353, at *4. But see Bhd. of R.R. Trainmen v. Baltimore &
Ohio R.R. Co., 331 U.S. 519, 528 (1947) (reasoning that examining statute titles is not useful
for interpretive purposes); He v. Chertoff, No. 07 C 363, 2008 WL 36634, at *5 n.3 (N.D. I11.
Jan. 2, 2008) ("Plaintiffs do not make the futile argument, suggested by headings within the
statute, that section 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) bars judicial review only of decisions in removal
proceedings. The law in this Circuit is that the statute's coverage is not limited in this way."
(citing El-Khader v. Monica, 366 F.3d 562, 566 (7th Cir. 2004))).
317. Shah, 2007 WL 3232353, at *4 (referring to § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i), which also falls
under the title "Denials of discretionary relief' (citing Paunescu, 76 F. Supp. 2d 896 )).
318. Paunescu, 76 F. Supp. 2d at 900.
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an alien's status." 3 19 She held that given its purpose, § 1252(a)(2)(B) could
not be interpreted in a way that would permit USCIS to refuse to act on
AOS applications or in a way that would allow them to "obtain the benefit
of a statute that protects 'discretionary' acts when they have not exercised
any discretion. '320 More broadly, she noted that since Congress intended to
authorize noncitizens to seek AOS, "it is 'unlikely that Congress ...at the
same time also intended section 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) to place beyond judicial
review decisions by the immigration authorities that nullified the statute.'
In other words, a right to request relief inherently implies a corresponding
'3 2 1
obligation to respond."
This section has shown the reasoning behind the asserting courts'
findings that the INA's jurisdiction-stripping provisions do not foreclose
courts from hearing the AOS litigants' suits. These courts have also gone
on to debunk the myriad policy arguments the dismissing courts make. The
next section explores their thoughts.
4. Plaintiffs' Rights Trump National Security Concerns and Agency Issues
Like their dismissing counterparts, the asserting courts consider the many
relevant policy issues. Where the source of the delay is a name check, these
courts, like their counterparts, are sympathetic to the national security
concerns implicated in granting aliens permanent resident status. The
asserting courts, however, weigh the meticulousness of the background
checks against the need to actually conduct them, since applicants work and
live in the United States while investigations proceed. 322 "If there is some
legitimate national security concern with them or other applicants currently
living and working in the country, this surely militates in favor of prompt
'323
security checks, not in favor of delay.
Many courts are skeptical of the government's national security
arguments. Judge Crabb said,
"[N]ational security" is not a magic talisman that can be waved in front of
courts whenever the government seeks to insulate itself from judicial
review. Defendants must make some showing that a requirement to
process plaintiffs application
in five years presents a danger; they cannot
324
rely solely on an ipse dixit.

319. Saleem v. Keisler, 520 F. Supp. 2d 1048, 1057 (W.D. Wis. 2007) (quoting Subhan v.
Ashcroft, 383 F.3d 591, 594 (7th Cir. 2004)).
320. Id.
321. Id. at 1054 (quoting Subhan, 383 F.3d at 595).
322. Dong v. Chertoff, 513 F. Supp. 2d 1158, 1170 (N.D. Cal. 2007).
323. Id.; see also USCIS, supra note 50, at 40 (concluding that, although name checks
were implemented to enhance national security, they "may increase the risk... by extending
the time a potential criminal or terrorist remains in the country"); Hsu & Aizenman, supra
note 75.
324. Saleem, 520 F. Supp. 2d at 1060; see also Singh v. Still, 470 F. Supp. 2d 1064, 1069

(N.D. Cal. 2006) (holding that the "mere invocation of national security is not enough to
render agency delay reasonable per se").
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One court thought these arguments were simply "red herring[s]. 332256
Defendants must offer meaningful explanations for the lengthy delays.
Name checks may become less of a problem for applicants-depending on
how USCIS implements its new expediting policy and whether the agency
maintains it 32 7-but

national security is still worth noting as a factor in

these courts' decisions.
These courts are also unreceptive to other policy arguments from the
government. In He v. Chertoff, the court refused to participate in what it
called "'shell game' reasoning," which would allow USCIS to dodge its
duties to applicants by shifting blame to the FBI when a name check was
the cause of delay. 328 It is true that the FBI controls the pace of name check
processing, the He court held, but USCIS has the ability to expedite checks,
promptly request them, and follow up with the FBI to keep checks from
"slip[ping] through the cracks. ' 329 In Dong, Judge Armstrong recognized
the fiscal and administrative burdens of processing millions of name checks
each year, but she insisted that the courts are "not in a position to relieve the
defendants of their obligation to comply with their mandatory duties....
[I]t is not the place of the judicial branch to weigh a plaintiff s clear right to
administrative action against the agency's burdens in complying. ' 330 The
political question at issue, then, was not the judiciary's role in
administrative improvements, as the dismissing courts held. Rather, the
issue concerned whether the FBI had adequate resources to process such an
enormous volume of name checks, and she declined "to attempt to address
this issue by sanctioning the defendants' non-compliance."' 33 1 Judge
Armstrong also tackled the ancillary applicant fairness issue the
government successfully raised in dismissing courts. To her, the linecutting argument was specious: "[T]hese plaintiffs have more than 'waited
their turn,' having seen millions of later-filed applications processed before
'332
theirs.... [They] are simply asking to be placed back in the queue.
For the asserting courts, the policy issues weigh strongly in favor of
hearing the AOS litigants' cases. Thus, having addressed the legal and
policy issues relevant in the AOS cases, the asserting courts deny the
government's motions to dismiss the suits on one or both of the plaintiffs'
theories. The success of the various theories is explored in the section that
follows.
325. Dong, 513 F. Supp. 2dat 1170.
326. See, e.g., Zalmout v. Gonzalez, No. 07-12575, 2007 WL 3121532, at *3 (E.D. Mich.
Oct. 24, 2007) (scheduling an evidentiary hearing since defendants provided no explanation

for the four-year delay).
327. See supra notes 104-12 and accompanying text for a discussion of the new policy
and other challenges the agency faces.
328. He v. Chertoff, No. 07 C 363, 2008 WL 36634, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 2, 2008); see
also Singh, 470 F. Supp. 2d at 1068 (emphasizing that "[t]he critical issue ... is whether the
individual petitioner versus the government qua government is responsible" for the delay).
329. He, 2008 WL 36634, at *4.
330. Dong, 513 F. Supp. 2d at 1170-71.
331. Id. at 1171.
332. Id.
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5. Successful Plaintiff Theories: The Administrative Procedure Act,
the Mandamus and Venue Act, or Both?
Having found that immigration officials have a nondiscretionary duty to
AOS applicants to adjudicate their applications within a reasonable time
and that § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) does not foreclose judicial review, these courts
then analyze which of the APA and mandamus theories of relief supported
subject matter jurisdiction at trial. Some courts only proceed on one theory
or the other; other courts proceed on both.
a. Success on Administrative ProcedureAct Grounds333
Most asserting courts hold that the APA offers appropriate grounds for
the plaintiffs' claims, relying on § 555(b) and § 706(1) of the statute, which
provide for agency action within a reasonable time. 334 The first prong of a
two-part APA jurisdictional analysis, 335 which calls for the existence of a
nondiscretionary duty to act, is established by virtue of the analysis in Part
II.B. l of this Note. 336 Surviving the government's motions to dismiss, then,
hinges on whether there has been unreasonable delay to support the second
337
jurisdictional prong.
In Shah v. Hansen, Judge Patricia Gaughan began this analysis by
determining whether any of the APA preclusionary provisions at § 701(a)
foreclosed judicial review. 33 8 She found that § 701(a)(1), precluding
review where Congress has so mandated, did not apply because Congress
did not provide clear and convincing evidence in § 1252(a)(2)(B) of its
intention to divest district courts of subject matter jurisdiction over actions
to compel adjudication of AOS applications. 339
Section 701(a)(2),
prohibiting review of actions specifically left to agency discretion, was also
333. Many courts premise jurisdiction only on APA grounds. See Shah v. Hansen, No.
1:07 CV 1576, 2007 WL 3232353, at *7 (N.D. Ohio Oct. 31, 2007); Saleem v. Keisler, 520
F. Supp. 2d 1048, 1049 (W.D. Wis. 2007) (deciding on APA grounds and not reaching
mandamus); Landry v. Chertoff, No. 07-0506, 2007 WL 2007996, at *2 (E.D. La. July 5,
2007); Gelfer v. Chertoff, No. C 06-06724 WHA, 2007 WL 902382, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Mar.
22, 2007) ("In light of their similarities and by finding jurisdiction under the APA, this order
need not address whether mandamus jurisdiction exists in the context of petitioner's
claim.").
334. See, e.g., Duan v. Zamberry, No. 06-1351, 2007 WL 626116, at *4 (W.D. Pa. Feb.
23, 2007) (quoting Hu v. Reno, No. 3-99-CV- 1136-BD, 2000 WL 425174, at *3 (N.D. Tex.
Apr. 18, 2000)); see also supra notes 151-54 and accompanying text.
335. See supra note 150 and accompanying text.
336. See supra notes 253-90 and accompanying text.
337. See infra notes 341-44 and accompanying text.
338. Shah, 2007 WL 3232353, at *4; see also supra notes 157-61. Jurisdiction was
properly premised on the federal question statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1331. See supra note 145 and
accompanying text.
339. Shah, 2007 WL 3232353, at *4; see also Saleem v. Keisler, 520 F. Supp. 2d 1048,
1052 (W.D. Wis. 2007) ("The question is not whether evidence exists to show that Congress
intended to allow review; rather, the question is whether there is 'clear and convincing'
evidence that Congress intended to preclude review." (citation omitted)); supra notes 17375 and accompanying text.
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inapplicable because nothing in the INA or its implementing regulations
but the
gives USCIS discretion over whether or not to act on an application,
340
implementing regulations and APA § 555(b) support such a duty.
Some districts require plaintiffs to show that they have a clear right to
relief under the APA to survive dismissal, which requires the plaintiff to
"demonstrate there has been a final agency action for which there is no
other adequate remedy in court. ' 34 1 While immigration officials in these
cases have taken no explicit "final action," courts have held that USCIS
"cannot legitimately evade judicial review forever by continually
postponing any consequence-laden action and then challenging federal
34 2 Under APA definitions,
jurisdiction on 'final agency action' grounds."
"agency action" includes the failure to act, 343 and at some point, that failure
34 4
to act becomes final.
b. Success on Mandamus Grounds
Many courts have recognized that USCIS's duties with respect to AOS
applications support mandamus jurisdiction. 34 5 For relief under the statute,
a petitioner must establish that "(1) [their] claim is clear and certain; (2) the
as
official's duty is nondiscretionary, ministerial, and so plainly prescribed
346
to be free from doubt; and (3) no other adequate remedy is available."
In districts where the duty to adjudicate AOS applications in a reasonable
time exists, AOS litigants' mandamus claims usually survive the dismissal
stage with a preliminary showing of possible unreasonable application
delay that would make their claims clear and certain. With regard to the
last element, courts have held that "'[w]aiting for an agency to act cannot
logically be an adequate alternative to an order compelling the agency to
act. Neither would it be reasonable to require Plaintiffs to wait to raise their

340. Shah, 2007 WL 3232353, at *5; see also Soneji v. Dep't of Homeland Sec., No. 072290 SC, 2007 WL 3101660, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 22, 2007) ("[Having discretion in
application adjudication does not mean that the government has] the discretion to do nothing
with an 1-485 application. Such an interpretation not only pushes the bounds of common
sense but is also contradicted by a wealth of authority from this and other districts."
(citations omitted)); Gelfer v. Chertoff, No. C 06-06724 WHA, 2007 WL 902382, at *2
(N.D. Cal. Mar. 22, 2007) ("[Rlespondents have a statutorily prescribed duty to adjudicate
petitioner's application 'within a reasonable time' under 5 U.S.C. § 555(b) .... ); supra
notes 269-75 and accompanying text.
341. Shah, 2007 WL 3232353, at *6 (citing 5 U.S.C. § 704 (2000)).
342. Id. (quoting Nat'l Parks Conservation Ass'n v. Norton, 324 F.3d 1229, 1239 (1 1th
Cir. 2003)).
343. 5 U.S.C. § 551(13).

344. Shah, 2007 WL 3232353, at *6 (citing 5 U.S.C. § 551(13)).
345. See, e.g., Xu v. Chertoff, No. 07-366, 2007 WL 2033834, at *4 (D.N.J. July 11,
2007) (concluding that "the duty to process [AOS] applications in a reasonable time [is] a
nondiscretionary duty imposed by the APA and reviewable through the mandamus statute");
Ma v. Gonzales (Ma I), No. C07-122RSL, 2007 WL 1655188, at *4 (W.D. Wash. June 5,
2007); Duan v. Zamberry, No. 06-1351, 2007 WL 626116, at *5 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 23, 2007).
346. See supra note 141 and accompanying text.
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347
claims until the government initiated removal proceedings. "'
Furthermore, even if aspects of the process are discretionary, an official's
"'duty may be discretionary within limits. He can not [sic] transgress those
limits, and if he does so, he may be controlled by injunction or mandamus
to keep within them. The power of the court to intervene, if at all, thus
depends upon what statutory discretion he has."' 348 In these districts,
immigration officials do not have discretion to sit on an application
indefinitely.

c. Success on Both Administrative ProcedureAct
and Mandamus and Venue Act Grounds
Some courts have asserted jurisdiction under both the mandamus and
APA statutes. 349 For example, in Dong v. Chertoff, Judge Armstrong held
that USCIS violated its duty to comply with the procedural requirements for
withholding adjudication of an AOS application at 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(b)(18),
350
clearing the way for subject matter jurisdiction under both statutes.
Other jurisdictions have declined to reach mandamus jurisdiction, finding
that the availability of the APA forecloses plaintiffs from satisfying the last
35 1
prong of a mandamus claim.
Part II.B has explored the asserting courts' approach to the many legal
and policy issues relevant to AOS litigants' cases. Their reasoning
contrasts starkly with the dismissing courts at nearly every turn. Part III
advocates the asserting courts' approach, arguing that it is the most faithful
to the spirit and the letter of U.S. immigration law, the most workable, and
the approach that best serves the broader policy and human interest
concerns at stake in these cases.
III. OUT OF LIMBO AND INTO A RESOLUTION
Parts I and II introduced the AOS process and reasons a conclusion is
sometimes delayed, the litigation surrounding that delay, and the district
courts' approaches in deciding the government's motions to dismiss. The
two approaches ask the same three basic questions-and reach completely
different answers. First, they ask whether there is a duty to adjudicate AOS
applications at all. 352 Then, they ask whether USCIS has a duty to do so in
a reasonable time. Finally, they ask whether the INA's jurisdiction-

347. Singh v. Still, 470 F. Supp. 2d 1064, 1071 (N.D. Cal. 2006) (quoting Fu v. Reno,
No. 3:99-CV-0981-L, 2000 WL 1644490, at *4 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 1, 2000)).
348. Wei Tan v. Gonzales, No. 07-cv-00133-MEH-MJW, 2007 WL 1576108, at *2 (D.
Colo. May 30, 2007) (quoting Work v. United States ex rel. Rives, 267 U.S. 175, 177
(1925)).
349. E.g., He v. Chertoff, No. 07 C 363, 2008 WL 36634, at *4-5 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 2, 2008);
Singh, 470 F. Supp. 2d at 1067.
350. Dong v.Chertoff,513 F. Supp.2d 1158, 1161-62, 1169 (N.D.Cal. 2007).
351. E.g., Saleh v. Ridge, 367 F. Supp.2d 508, 511-12 (S.D.N.Y.2005).
352. This question isless controversial than the second two. See supra note 194.
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stripping provisions apply to foreclose judicial review. 353 In reaching their
divergent conclusions, the courts have analyzed in detail the relevant
statutes and regulations. Part III reviews their opposing interpretations of
the law and argues that the asserting courts' reading is superior. It also
argues, however, that the decisions described in this Note are more heavily
informed by a backdrop of policy considerations than they appear to be, and
that close consideration of that backdrop weighs strongly in favor of the
asserting courts' position.
A. Interpretingthe Law
Part III begins by addressing the many statutes and regulations at issue in
AOS litigation. It answers the three basic questions posed above and argues
that together they weigh strongly in favor of denying the government's
motions to dismiss in these cases.
1. The Duty to Adjudicate Adjustment of Status Applications Exists
The first question courts ask is whether USCIS has a duty to adjudicate
AOS applications. For several reasons, the answer must be yes. First,
defendants have conceded this duty on many occasions. 354 Second, the
dismissing courts sometimes concede that the duty to adjudicate AOS
applications exists, and, if not, they often imply it. In their opinions, they
frequently leave themselves escape hatches should a case come before them
where delay was "indefinite" or "tantamount to abandonment" of an
application. 3 55 Caveats like these evince the weakness of the dismissing
courts' interpretation of § 1255(a).
Third, the asserting courts are correct that the duty should be inferred
from the existence 356-if not the letter-of § 1255(a), which says that the
attorney general may "in his discretion and under such regulations as he
may prescribe" adjust a qualified alien's status to LPR. 3 57 Fairly read, the
primary purpose of this provision is to authorize qualified aliens to seek
LPR status, 3 58 and secondarily to give the attorney general discretion over
application decisions. Even denied applicants "retain[] the right" to apply
for AOS in removal proceedings. 359 Dismissing courts that disagree
inappropriately place agency discretion above the duty to adjudicate an
application. Such a reading contravenes the INA provision commanding
353. Interesti-igly, in no case researched for this Note was there a decision holding that
there was a duty to act in a reasonable time but that the jurisdiction-stripping provision
precluded the lawsuit. The courts answered either "yes" or "no" to both the second and third
questions.
354. See sources cited supra note 194.

355. See sources cited supra note 194.
356. See supra note 257 and accompanying text.
357. 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a) (2000); see supra Part I.C.3.a; see also supra note 35 and
accompanying text.
358. See supra notes 169, 257 and accompanying text.
359. See supra note 188 and accompanying text.
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that the Homeland Security secretary "shall be charged with the
administration and enforcement [of immigration]. ' 360 The secretary cannot
be charged with immigration administration and simultaneously have no
duty to administrate. Such a result is irrational.
2. The Duty to Adjudicate Adjustment of Status Applications
in a Reasonable Time Exists
In answer to the second question, a reasonable time duty must
accompany the duty to adjudicate AOS applications if it is to have any
meaning. 36 1 The dismissing courts are right that the text of the INA does
not explicitly confer on USCIS a duty to process and adjudicate AOS
applications in a reasonable time, 362 but that does not necessarily lead to the
conclusion that the agency has unlimited time to reach decisions. As the
Razaq court put it, the "'duty to decide' becomes no duty at all if it is
'363
accompanied by unchecked power to decide when to decide.
The APA provision directing an agency to "conclude a matter presented
to it" within a "reasonable time" substantiates this position. 364 Dismissing
courts argue that the absence of a time frame for AOS adjudication in the
INA nullifies the applicability of that provision and the availability of APA
relief in these suits. 365 They cite the explicit time frames set out for
naturalization applications and those for firearms dealer and manufacturer
licenses to show that Congress could have placed time constraints on the
AOS process if it had wanted to. 3 66 Asserting courts have not been
persuaded by this argument, and neither is this Note. For one, defendants
have not cited analogous situations where such an absence was fatal to APA
claims. 367 Second, Supreme Court decisions support the idea that the
APA's reasonableness provisions are appropriate in situations where
Congress meant to provide for review and did not supply timelines. 368 It
makes sense that Congress would want to give USCIS flexibility in making
AOS decisions. For one, Congress might recognize that because the agency
is largely self-funded and has struggled with backlogs for years-and is
currently grappling with a new processing backlog-it would be
impracticable to hold it to deadlines that it might not have the resources to
meet. 36 9 Second, AOS applications, unlike those for citizenship the
360. See supra note 189 and accompanying text.
361. See supra notes 281-85 and accompanying text. In 2005, USCIS at least implicitly
agreed: its official policy was to fast-track name checks for applicants who filed mandamus
suits in federal courts. See supranotes 123-27 and accompanying text.
362. See supra notes 198-202 and accompanying text.
363. Razaq v. Poulos, No. C 06-2461 WDB, 2007 WL 61884, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 8,
2007); see supra note 283 and accompanying text.
364. 5 U.S.C. § 555(b) (2000); see supra note 152 and accompanying text.
365. See supra notes 198-202 and accompanying text.
366. See supra notes 200-02 and accompanying text.
367. See supra note 259 and accompanying text.
368. See supra note 280 and accompanying text.
369. See supra notes 104, 111-12 and accompanying text.
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dismissing courts cite, are not constrained by sponsorship requirements,
visa caps, waiting lists, and cutoff dates.
The two approaches interpret the same regulations and reach opposite
conclusions as to whether they support a duty to adjudicate in a reasonable
time. The dismissing courts note that the regulations command many
things, but they never dictate that USCIS shall adjudicate. 37 0 To the
asserting courts, the regulations' phrasing assumes adjudication will occur,
and a reasonable time duty must accompany the regulations for them to
have any meaning. 37 1 Another convincing reason for the asserting courts'
position lies with the regulation articulating procedures for withholding
Although defendants rarely utilize this avenue, its
applications. 372
existence is revealing: an agency having unfettered discretion in all matters
related to the timing and processing of applications would have no need for
withholding procedures. Dismissing courts correctly cite this provision as
evidence of USCIS's right to withhold adjudication, 37 3 but they wrongly
grant dismissal just because it is on the books. On the contrary, this
provision's existence supports the conclusion that USCIS may not
indefinitely withhold adjudication unless it is following its procedures for
doing so.

374

Many of the dismissing courts contradict their position that USCIS does
not have a duty to act in a reasonable time, further weakening their
holdings. 375 On the one hand, they hold that actions in the AOS process
and the pace of adjudication are completely within USCIS's discretion, but
then they look for evidence of the agency's action on an application,
dismissing a case as long as USCIS has not "refused to act" or has taken no
action. 376 This inquiry is illogical given the dismissing courts' position that
the agency's discretionary power is plenary and their reluctance to create
time frames where they believe none were intended. 37 7 Furthermore, the
conclusions they reach making this inquiry fall apart when one examines
the facts. The "action" that dismissing courts identify is the same as the
"inaction" asserting courts find, at least where an unresolved name check is
involved 378 : USCIS typically completes all aspects of an application and
then waits for the FBI name check to come through. 379 This distinction is
untenable. The dismissing courts ignore the fact that USCIS could take
action by exercising its power to expedite name checks but has chosen not

370. See supra notes 186, 204-07 and accompanying text.
371. See supra notes 188, 260-62 and accompanying text.

372. See supra note 186 and accompanying text.
373. See supra notes 204-08 and accompanying text.
374. These procedures provide for withheld applications to be reviewed every six months
by increasingly senior officials. See supra note 186 and accompanying text; see also supra
notes 265-68 and accompanying text.
375. See supra notes 286-87 and accompanying text.
376. See sources cited supra notes 192, 225.
377. See supra notes 198-202, 287, 366 and accompanying text.
378. See sources cited supra notes 194, 225.
379. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 194.
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to do so. 380 That significant passage of time and repeated applicant inquiry
do not rouse the
agency to do so is surely tantamount to "inaction" or a
"refusal to act. ' 38 1 That it chose litigation over expedition for more than a
382
year is even more powerful proof that it "refuses to act."
383
USCIS's new expediting policy implicitly acknowledges this point.
The policy further bolsters the idea that the agency has a duty to act and
undermines the dismissing courts' position that it does not.
An
underresourced agency with no duty to act would hardly make the
expeditious-and costly-resolution of name checks a priority. 3 84 Thus,
the facts do not square with the dismissing courts' conclusions.
The asserting courts, on the other hand, have not boxed themselves in the
way the dismissing courts have on an action-inaction distinction. Since
they allow these suits to survive the dismissal stage, they are not forced to
toe an untenable line between what constitutes "action" or "inaction." The
INA does not define these words, and Black's Law Dictionary385 is an
insufficient alternative: "action" and "inaction" in these cases are questions
of fact better decided on their merits.
The idea that USCIS has no duty to decide in a reasonable time also
clashes with other facts on the ground. Congress has allocated hundreds of
millions of dollars to USCIS-an ordinarily self-funded agencyspecifically to clear up backlogged cases. 386 If Congress were unconcerned
with timely application adjudications, it would not bother with these grants.
Furthermore, at a hearing before the House Subcommittee on Immigration,
then-USCIS Director Emilio Gonzalez stated, "I am mindful of my sworn
duty to maintain the integrity of our immigration service. Therefore, my
goal and heartfelt obligation is to make sure that USCIS has the resources
required to provide immigrants with the high quality professional assistance
they expect and deserve. ' 387 Granted, speedy adjudication can be a priority
without being a duty, but Gonzalez's conceptions of his job as USCIS
director and of his agency's purpose squares better with the asserting
courts' position than with the dismissing courts' idea that USCIS is free to
leave applicants in immigration limbo.

380. See supra Part I.C. 1; supra note 329 and accompanying text.
381. See sources cited supra note 194.
382. Compare USCIS's expediting policy from January 2005 to December 2006, supra
notes 123-27, with its expediting policy from December 2006 to February 2008, supra notes
128-31.
383. See supra notes 132-35 and accompanying text.
384. See supra notes 69, 104 and accompanying text.
385. See supra notes 220-22 and accompanying text.
386. See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
387. Proposed Immigration Fee Increase: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Immigration, Citizenship, Refugees, BorderSecurity, and InternationalLaw of the H. Comm.
on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 12 (2007) (statement of Emilio Gonzalez, Director, USCIS),
available at http://judiciary.house.gov/media/pdfs/printers/110th/33313.pdf.
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3. The Preclusionary Provisions Do Not Apply
In answer to the third question, the INA's jurisdiction-stripping
provisions do not preclude review of these cases. Both courts make heavily
textual analyses of the language in § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii). 388 The plain
language of the provision supports the approach in favor of judicial review.
The statute clearly precludes courts from asserting jurisdiction only where
(1) there is a discretionary "decision or action" by the attorney general or
the secretary of Homeland Security and (2) the authority for which is
specified within certain subchapters of title 8.389 In these cases, neither
requirement is satisfied because, as the courts succinctly explained, no
statutory provision in the relevant subchapters expressly gives the
390
government the power not to adjudicate an AOS application.
The problem with the dismissing courts' analysis is that it focuses
heavily on the meaning of the word "action" in the first part of the
provision. 39 1 This ignores the word's connection to the later, stricter
aspects of § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) requiring "action" to be expressly and
statutorily specified to be in the attorney general or Homeland Security
secretary's authority. 392 Once again, the dismissing courts trap themselves
by trying to answer as a matter of law factual questions about what
393
constitutes "action" and what does not.
In sum, the dismissing courts take an exclusionary approach to the law,
showing great deference to USCIS and its discretion and reading the INA's
preclusionary provisions broadly. 394 The asserting courts take a far less
restrictive approach to immigrants' rights, vigorously working to retain
jurisdiction, honoring the APA's presumption in favor of judicial review of
administrative actions, and trying to achieve a just result. 395 When it comes
to the many thousands of aliens who have waited a year, or many more, for
decisions on their AOS applications, the best approach to the law is the
second one. 396 The first approach allows-and probably encouragesUSCIS to drag its heels, leaving thousands of people in immigration limbo
without a judicial remedy. Surely, Congress did not create the AOS process
with this result in mind.

388. See supra Parts I1.A.2, II.B.3.
389. See supra Part Il.B.3.a-b; supra note 173 and accompanying text.
390. See supra Part II.B.3.a.
391. See supra Part II.A.2.
392. See supra note 192 and accompanying text.
393. See sources cited supra notes 194, 225.
394. See supra note 192 and accompanying text.
395. See supra note 252 and accompanying text.
396. After proper inquiry, it may be found that the facts support the government's
argument that it needs more time and is currently doing all that it can. Regarding the
plaintiffs' theories for relief, courts get it right when they dismiss the writs of mandamus and
uphold the APA claims. Although mandamus and APA relief run together and may be in
many ways indistinguishable, see supra Part I.C.2.c, mandamus requires that no other relief
be available, and the APA is certainly "other relief." See supra notes 141, 351 and

accompanying text.
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B. Incorporatingthe Circumstances
The conflict among the courts reflects not only different readings of the
relevant statutes and regulations but also two very different approaches to
the policy issues and circumstances underlying these cases. These issues
help explain the contradictions and caveats characteristic of the dismissing
courts' opinions. This section explores those issues and circumstances and
attempts to demonstrate that they actually support the asserting courts'
position.
The dismissing courts often cite USCIS's crucial and expanded national
security role in the wake of 9/11 as a reason for their holdings. 39 7 Their
concern is well-placed, but these courts uncritically accept blanket "national
security" arguments from USCIS and allow that significant delays are an
inevitable post-9/1 1 reality. 398 It is irrational to think that further delays on
security checks for aliens already living within America's borders does
anything to promote public safety. As the USCIS ombudsman and the
asserting courts argue, delayed background checks actually pose a
significant security risk by allowing subversives to remain in this country
longer.3 99 USCIS's new policy helps address the human element of this
400
issue by expediting adjudications and completing the name checks later,
but this is not enough. If USCIS is serious about national security, it should
be agency policy not to postpone but to focus on resolving the name checks
themselves-not to settle lawsuits, but to quickly weed out dangerous
individuals and have them deported. 40 1 If the courts presented with these
cases intend to advance national security, they should allow the suits to
survive the dismissal stage in order to make meaningful inquiries into what
is really going on and encourage the speedy resolution of name checks.
USCIS's various expediting policies also undermine the credibility of the
agency's national security arguments. For almost two years after 9/11,
USCIS's expediting policy was petitioner friendly: the agency expedited
402
name checks for applicants who filed mandamus suits in federal court.
Dismissing courts have ignored this. National security was the same if not
more of a concern for the agency when it had this policy in place, so
attempting to justify dismissal based on national security concerns is
irrational. Furthermore, USCIS's February 2008 policy directly contradicts
the arguments it has been making since December 2006: that national
security demands completion of the checks before application adjudication
by directing officials to go forth with not only adjudication but actual
approval of applications without a completed name check. 40 3 If the new
expediting policy remains in place and stems the flow of name-check-based
397.
398.
399.
400.
401.
402.
403.

See supra notes 244-47 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 247, 323-25 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 93, 323 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 133-34 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 93, 315-18 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 123, 127 and accompanying text.
See supra note 133 and accompanying text.
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AOS litigation, USCIS may never have to explain this contradiction to a

judge. But the agency has a pattern of abruptly changing its name check
expediting policies, 40 4 and if the policy changes back to its more restrictive

version in the future, judges should be wary40 5of any delays USCIS attempts
to justify with "national security" concerns.
Since USCIS's national security arguments are so weak, one suspects
that something else is going on here. The likely answer is that the
dismissing courts' concern that granting injunctions will overwhelm the

already overextended agencies involved in the AOS process 40 6 and thereby
undermine Congress's power "'to have its declared policy.., enforced
4 07
exclusively through executive officers, without judicial intervention.'
Agency resources are especially relevant given that the agency's planned
fee increase last summer, which was supposed to bring AOS processing
times down from six to four months, prompted a surge of applications that
doubled processing times instead. 40 8 In the wake of this ironic outcome, the
agency's own processing backlog is likely to become the new wellspring of
AOS litigation. But as some asserting courts rightly point out, it is not the
judiciary's job to alleviate the agencies' bureaucratic problems at the
applicants' expense. 40 9 Indeed, where "'an agency's recalcitrance, inertia,
laggard pace or inefficiency sorely disadvantages the class of beneficiaries
Congress intended to protect,"' 4 10 judicial review is appropriate.

404. See supra notes 123-35 and accompanying text.
405. Furthermore, one suspects that dangerous aliens would be rare in AOS litigation. It
is doubtful that applicants with something to hide would draw attention to themselves by
bringing a case in federal court. Petitioners are more likely to be people like Dr. Xiaoqing
Tang who have valid reasons for needing their applications decided quickly. See supra notes
3-7, 92 and accompanying text.
406. See supra notes 112, 248-50 and accompanying text.
407. Shen v. Chertoff, 494 F. Supp. 2d 592, 595 (E.D. Mich. 2007) (quoting Kleindienst
v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 766 (1972)).
408. See supra notes 108-12 and accompanying text. Incidentally, this new backlog will
affect all applicants equally (as delayed name checks do not), and thus might lead to a
redefinition of what adjudication in a "reasonable time" means, making it much harder for
applicants who survive the dismissal stage to prove their cases under the APA and the MVA.
409. See supra note 330 and accompanying text. Given its limited resources, it seems
like the agency's job should be to focus on resolving the applications (which it will have to
do anyway) and arguing for funds from Congress instead of arguing against the applicants
trapped in its backlog. Indeed, the law requiring USCIS to be funded by user fees needs to
be repealed. As evidence by the 150% AOS application fee hike last year, which doubled
the adjudication waiting time, this system is "unfair" and "forces immigrants to pay ever
more dearly for bad service." Editorial, Citizenship, Thwarted, N.Y. Times, Mar. 19, 2008,
at A18; see supra notes 108, 112 and accompanying text. Although this Note does not
discuss delayed citizenship applications, a similar pre-fee-hike surge occurred for those
applications during summer 2007, raising citizenship waiting times from five months to
fourteen to sixteen months. Editorial, supra. As a result, many would-be citizens likely will
Such "intentional
be unable to vote in the November presidential election.
disenfranchisement" is even more alarming evidence of how "dear[]" is the cost of a broken
immigration system. Id.
410. Yu v. Brown, 36 F. Supp. 2d 922, 929 (D.N.M. 1999) (quoting In re Am. Fed'n of
Gov't Employees, AFL-CIO, 790 F.2d 116, 117 (D.C. Cir. 1986)).
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CONCLUSION

This Note explored the conflict surrounding AOS applicants' injunctive
suits seeking decisions on their applications to become LPRs. The law in
this area is fractured and unsettled, but it centers primarily on
interpretations of two provisions in the INA and other relevant laws and
regulations, heavily informed by a host of policy considerations. The
superior interpretation is that USCIS has a clear duty to adjudicate all
applications properly before it in a reasonable time. When it violates that
duty, applicants have (in some jurisdictions) or should have (in others) legal
recourse. The United States owes more than a closed courtroom door to
individuals utilizing legal immigration channels.
This Note hopes that the cases on appeal in the circuit courts will resolve
this split, which exhibits a certain amount of arbitrariness. Around the
country, aliens with substantially similar circumstances pleading their cases
4 11
in courts interpreting exactly the same law have opposite experiences.
The courtroom door is open or closed depending, not upon the strength of
an applicant's case, but whether he lives in the right district or comes before
4 12
the right judge.

411. See sources cited supra notes 191-94.
412. See sources cited supra notes 191-94.

